EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Turkmenistan: Keeping the West Hanging

EURASIA INSIGHT

TURKMENISTAN: KEEPING THE WEST HANGING
Nicholas Birch 3/25/08

Turkmen leader Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, during a two-day visit to Turkey, didn’t give the West what it wanted, namely a firm commitment to participate in the planned trans-Caspian pipeline. But he did give the United States and European Union reason to believe that he wants closer economic and political relations.

Upon completing his visit March 24, Berdymukhamedov simply expressed a desire to broaden and deepen bilateral ties with Turkey. Turkish President Abdullah Gul described discussions with Berdymukhamedov as "productive," adding that they will "light the way" for the strengthening of economic contacts. In a joint statement, the two stressed that Turkey and Turkmenistan would focus on developing energy cooperation.

More encouraging than Berdymukhamedov’s Turkey visit was his earlier announcement that he would be attending the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Bucharest in early April. That trip would offer top US and EU officials, including US President George W. Bush, an opportunity for intensive lobbying of Berdymukhamedov to make a trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP) commitment.

Berdymukhamedov’s reluctance to make a splash during his visit to Turkey with a TCP announcement came as a disappointment to some. For coldly calculating analysts, however, the Turkmen leader was simply sticking to his geopolitical script, trying to string out the main players in the Caspian Basin energy game in order to secure maximum advantage for his regime.

The speculation surrounding his future intentions no doubt has helped Turkmenistan obtain large economic concessions from the Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In spite of Berdymukhamedov’s interest in deepening ties with the West, some Turkish energy analysts don’t believe the Turkmen leader will do anything to cross Russia, which now obtains the bulk of Turkmenistan’s natural gas exports. "I would be delighted if the TCP were built, but with Russia increasingly powerful, I unfortunately can’t see the project getting off the drawing board", says Necdet Pamir, a Turkish energy expert.

For Pamir, the Caspian dispute is not the only obstacle facing western efforts to break Russia’s stranglehold on Central Asian energy exports. At the moment, he points out, Turkmen gas production is struggling to keep up with growing demand from non-western buyers.

Turkey is clearly not pinning all its energy hopes on TPC. Asked recently what his priority projects were, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler replied "Iraq and Turkmenistan." The Turkish journalist asking the question interpreted his Delphic response as evidence of his support for TCP, but Guler might equally have been thinking of another transit option - via Iran.

Dependent on Russia for two-thirds of its gas, Turkey would like to increase imports from Iran. Currently, Ankara imports about 8 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Iran. These imports are a source of friction with Washington. When Turkey announced plans last September to sign a $3 billion accord with Iran to exploit the South Pars gas field in southern Iran, some Europeans openly welcomed the news. US officials, meanwhile, urged Ankara to "sacrifice" the project in favor of a united front to promote Iran’s economic isolation.

As a NATO member and a key strategic partner of the United States, Turkey’s energy bind will probably not ease for the foreseeable future. The existing dilemma was underscored by the fact that Berdymukhamedov and visiting US Vice President Dick Cheney, the Bush administration point man on energy issues, briefly crossed paths in Turkey on March 24.

Cheney’s visit hinted that, if anything, Turkey’s balancing act stands to become more difficult. Given surprisingly little space by a Turkish media obsessed with the country’s growing political crisis, Cheney’s meetings with Turkish officials appeared friendly enough. He expressed is support for a new Turkish-American Joint Energy Committee that got the go-ahead when Gul visited Washington last January. But he also asked Turkey to "raise her voice" against what he called Iran’s "nuclear armament program."

Cheney left Turkey after six hours without giving a press conference, making it difficult to know what alternative energy sources to Iran he might have proposed to officials in Ankara. The general drift of US policy recently, though, has been to emphasize the energy export potential of Iraq.

Several Turkish companies have expressed a strong interest in exploiting largely untouched gas and oil fields in southern Iraq. Yet Turks are far from convinced that their southern neighbor is in any state these days to provide the energy supplies they desire. "Sure, the potential is there, but conditions in Iraq have to change radically first," Pamir said. In the meantime, Berdymukhamedov would seem to hold all the wild cards.

Editor�s Note: Nicolas Birch specializes in Turkey, Iran and the Middle East.

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