EurasiaNet Eurasia Insight - Georgia Vents Frustration with UN, OSCE

EURASIA INSIGHT

GEORGIA VENTS FRUSTRATION WITH UN, OSCE
Nina Akhmeteli 9/20/07

Georgian ire over recent statements coming out of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe underscores the limits of Tbilisi’s long-standing strategy to use international organizations as a counterweight to Russian influence in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

With President Mikheil Saakashvili scheduled to address the UN General Assembly in New York on September 26, Georgia’s troubles with the UN and OSCE could come into sharper focus. On September 6, Saakashvili responded to a recommendation by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that Georgia move a patriotic youth camp away from the border with Abkhazia, calling it "amoral and meager."

"We do not ask for such advice," Saakashvili retorted, in remarks broadcast by Georgian television. The Georgian leader went on to question the effectiveness of efforts undertaken by the "UN and other organizations" to promote lasting peace in Abkhazia, specifically in promoting the return of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. UN officials were not available for comment, though facilitating IDP return is a long-stated goal of the organization.

Saakashvili will devote a considerable portion of his UN address to the situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with a mysterious missile incident an August, according to presidential spokesperson Dmitri Kitoshvili. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze maintains that, despite its criticism of recent UN comments, Tbilisi remains intent on securing more active UN participation in conflict resolution in the breakaway Black Sea region. Tbilisi has been waging an aggressive campaign to have international peacekeepers replace Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "We demand the same that we’ve always demanded in recent years: to have more intense international policy and involvement," Bakradze told EurasiaNet.

Officials in Tbilisi suggest Russian obstructionism has helped prevent international organizations from intensifying peace-keeping and peace-building activities in the Caucasus. State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Issues Giorgi Baramidze believes that Russia’s veto power within the UN Security Council, and its overall "strong position" within the organization, played a significant role in shaping the UN’s stance on the patriotic youth camp.

Many government officials in Tbilisi are similarly convinced that Moscow influenced the OSCE to shy away from pursuing an investigation into the August missile incident. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In a September 6 report, the organization’s special envoy, Miomir Zuzul, stated that it was "extremely difficult to have a clear picture" of the events surrounding the August 6 event. A group of foreign experts determined that the missile was fired by a jet that flew out of Russian territory. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. "Very often both the OSCE and the UN can’t say the truth that is evident for many others," charged Baramidze.

Local analysts agree. "The OSCE has tense relations with Moscow and it tried to be politically correct towards Russia,’ said Zurab Abashidze, vice-president of the Georgian Council on Foreign Relations. Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, maintains that the Kremlin’s ability to block funding for OSCE programs also plays a role. OSCE officials did respond to the criticism in time for this story.

One local observer argues that Tbilisi’s interests would be better served if it engaged in direct talks with the de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaderships, rather than waiting for international organizations to take action. "Russia has a strong position in both international organizations and the only way for us to neutralize Russia is to have bilateral negotiations with the other side of the conflict," said Shalva Pichkhadze, chairman of Georgia for NATO, a non-governmental organization.

While dissatisfaction with the UN and OSCE seems to mount in Tbilisi, Georgians are increasingly hopeful that national security will receive a boost from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In a September 18 interview with the daily Rezonansi (Resonance), Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that the administration believes "a political decision" will be made about Georgia’s NATO membership in time for the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"Further integration into NATO will be the best solution for conflict resolution," Bakradze, the state minister, told a visiting delegation from NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, news outlets reported. "And a MAP [Membership Action Plan] for us will be a signal of political support."

The extent to which NATO’s own interests mirror Georgian expectations, however, remains a matter for some debate within policy circles. To date, the Brussels-based alliance has walked a careful line. In April 2007, its Parliamentary Assembly stated that neither Russia nor the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist leaders should be allowed to "thwart Georgia’s goals, particularly if Georgia is acting in good faith to resolve the conflicts." Georgian officials naturally would like NATO to toughen its line. Bakradze, for example, told the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation: "To have an institutional response to Russia’s aggression is a matter of European security."

Editor�s Note: Nina Akhmeteli is a freelance reporter based in Tbilisi.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

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