EurasiaNet Recaps - Georgian Official Says Russia's "Goal is Chaos"

RECAPS

GEORGIAN OFFICIAL SAYS RUSSIA’S "GOAL IS CHAOS"

Irakly Areshidze 8/16/02
A Q&A with Malkhaz Kakabadze and Irakli Batiashvili

The escalating tension between Georgia and Russia is drawing international attention. The European Union has issued a statement calling for restraint and the mutual respect of international borders � a reference to reports that Russian military aircraft have on several occasions violated Georgian air space. The Russian Foreign Ministry has dismissed the EU statement, saying it "distracts from tackling the practical tasks of eliminating the real threat to security and stability," the Interfax news agency reported.

Georgian officials have categorically dismissed Russian claims that Tbilisi is actively assisting Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge, and have rejected Russian requests for a joint military operation in the region. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov claimed August 15 that some separatists killed recently in Chechnya possessed Georgian-language refugee documents. Georgian officials have rejected the allegation.

Meanwhile, Georgian and Abkhaz forces faced off in the Kodori Gorge. Urgent negotiations managed to avert a resumption of fighting, as the two sides agreed to establish a de-militarized zone. Abkhazia also agreed to turn over maps to Georgian leaders that identify minefields. The Kodori Gorge is the only area of Abkhazia still under Tbilisi’s control. Abkhaz forces gained de facto independence during a 1992-93 civil war. The two sides have maintained a tenuous cease-fire since then, as they probe for a political settlement to the conflict.

To help analyze developments in Abkhazia, the Pankisi Gorge, and the overall Russian-Georgian relationship, EurasiaNet contributor Irakly Areshidze spoke with two senior members of the Georgian leadership � Minister for Special Assignments Malkhaz Kakabadze, and the Chairman of the Parliament’s Committee on Defense and Security, Irakli Batiashvili. Kakabadze was appointed to his current post a little over two years ago, and previously served as Ambassador to Russia and Deputy Foreign Minister. Batiashvili resigned a top state security post in 1993 to protest Georgia’s entry into the Commonwealth of Independent States. He now is one of the leaders of the New Rights Party, and became chairman of the Defense Committee in May. The text of the interviews with Kakabadze and Batiashvili follows:

EurasiaNet: What happened in Abkhazia this week, and why did this happen?
Kakabadze: It might sound odd, but given that there is a conflict situation in Abkhazia, there is a conditional division of the territory by zones. There is a zone that Georgians control, the Kodori Gorge region and territory surrounding it, and others parts of Abkhazia which are controlled by the separatist government. The Abkhaz side broke the provisional line between these two zones, crossed into the area controlled by Georgia, and opened up posts. This of course stirred a reaction from the Georgian side. It is important to note that there are no Georgian army units in Kodori. There are members of the Border Guard, which is an independent unit of the government, it carries police functions, and it is a Western-style unit, unlike the Soviet-era boarder troops, which were part of the military.

With the efforts of the Border Guard units and the local population, the building of the Abkhaz posts was stopped. There was indeed some firing from both sides. Avtandil Jorbenadze [Georgia’s State Minister], the Head of the Border Guard Department, Valeri Chkheidze, and I went to Kodori in order to try to resolve the situation. Emzar Kvitsiani, the President’s representative to Kodori, joined us, and we sat down for a discussion with the Abkhaz side, and presented to them on a map our point of view about the situation and the crossing of the provisional zone-line by the Abkhaz side. The Abkhaz side shared our view. It appeared to us that the Abkhaz side is not supporting the escalation of the situation�that someone is forcing them to escalate it, in order to drive the negotiation process into a corner. These negotiations with the Abkhaz side are now entering the most critical phase, the discussions of the political status, and someone is trying to sabotage these discussions. In this, fundamentally, the Russian side has an interest. As well, for some reason, Russia has a view that it must control the Kodori region. There have been a few offers, all rejected by the Georgian side, to open posts of Russian "peacekeepers" there. It seems to us that this element was partly responsibly for the incident.

EurasiaNet: There has been speculation in Tbilisi that Russia desires that Chechen fighters move to Abkhazia, where Moscow could foment instability and provocations could be created. What do you make of this analysis?
Kakabadze: Last year, something like this happened, with the Gulaiev incident, or operation. I do not have all information, but Russian special units were involved in this incident. It appears that the Chechen side had an agreement with the Russian side that the boarder would be open, but then Russian side and the Abkhaz side betrayed them, and the boarder was closed. These people then were left on their own, and were forced to fight, but that they had not intended to fight originally. I believe in this version because Russia needs to find a new Pankisi in Georgia, and if Chechen fighters enter Abkhazia, then this will be a significant problem, and it will be easy for Russia to create provocations there.

EurasiaNet: Many Georgians believe that Russian actions, both in Abkhazia and in Pankisi, are aimed at creating chaos in Georgia. Do you agree with this view? If yes, why does Russia want chaos in Georgia?
Kakabadze: Of course, the goal is chaos. Certain circles in Russia cannot get used to the idea of Georgian independence, or to the role that Georgia is developing in the international scene. I have in mind the international projects, the independent foreign and domestic politics of Georgia, and the course Georgia’s choice to build relations with the European-Atlantic structures. Of course these circles wish to bring to Georgia a government which will be under their control. I can declare with full confidence that even if these circles and forces try to achieve something, such a political force will not be able to come to power in Georgia. The Georgian people will not accept a force with such a perspective.

EurasiaNet: Some see a coincidence or a relationship between Russian, and specifically, President Vladimir Putin’s demands, regarding Georgia and its leadership, and claims made by political forces within Georgia. Do you see a relationship between these demands?
Kakabadze: I do see a relationship. But I must tell everyone that [President Eduard} Shevardnadze will continue to serve as Georgia’s president, while those people might disappear, I have the political arena in mind.

EurasiaNet: How do you account for the recent escalation in the relationship between Georgia and Russia?
Batiashvili: Events in Pankisi and Kodori are connected to the Russian unwillingness to accept Georgian independence, and are means of psychological terror on Georgia. Start with the media propaganda. Then add to it provocations, such as bombing of Georgian territory�Russia has wonderful intelligence services, who know very well where to bomb and where not to, and where potential armed forces might be located in Pankisi. Russia was purposefully bombing unpopulated areas, because the bombing was not aimed to kill Chechen forces, but was a source of psychological warfare against Georgia. Similarly, in Kodori, or to be accurate, in the Marukhi Pass, the appearance of armed forces was yet another method of psychological pressure aimed at further complicating the situation. The goal is for our society to always be under Russian pressure and fear of further escalation in the relationship with Moscow.

Having just returned from Kodori, I believe it is too early to say that the situation is fully resolved there. These were very well trained forces�it must have taken a long time for these forces to be trained�and they have only moved back a few kilometers. Tomorrow the situation might become just as tense as it was on Monday and Tuesday. The fact is that Abkhaz separatist government does not wish war. They control the territory, and they wish peace so that more tourists can come to Abkhazia. However, Russia controls the separatist government, and it is highly likely that the armed forces appeared in Marukhi under Russian pressure.

Georgian government has to be very careful. It is critical for us to deal with the situation in Pankisi. The local population there�the Kisti [ethnically Chechen Georgians] population�is coming out and saying, we do not want Russian forces here, we want the Georgian government to take care of the criminals. However, we have to be careful, because it is likely that our neighbor is prepared with new provocations to further escalate the situation and involve us in a serious conflict. I do seriously hope that Georgian actions will be well designed and will be supported by the local population.

EurasiaNet: Why do you think Russian government has tried to escalate the situation so quickly and so radically?
Batiashvili: There are three main factors. First, the recent successes connected to the oil and gas pipelines that are well known. Second, the Train and Equip Program and the appearance of US forces in Georgia. This program�US military assistance and cooperation in general�is the greatest source of security for Georgia�Russia knows this very well. Third, the fact that Georgia is not willing to allow Russia to conduct "anti-terrorist" operations in Pankisi, which would mean spreading the Chechen war into Georgia and involving our country in a regional Caucasian war. Even during [Former Russian President Boris] Yeltsin’s time, Russia was demanding that our territory be used to bomb Chechen forces. Georgia rejected this then, and the relationship between Georgia and Russia soured significantly. Today you have similar demands.

Though it is also likely that there are more global reasons for why Russia is acting so aggressively at this time. There was a story in The Wall Street Journal, for example, which speaks to the possibility that Russia wishes the US to trade Georgia for Iraq. In other words, if US has the right to conduct operations in Iraq, something that worries Russia a great deal and is completely unacceptable for them, and if US does act and justly remove the Hussein regime, US authority in the world will increase and Russian will fall. Therefore, Russian action in Georgia might very well be a response to American planned action in Iraq.

EurasiaNet: Many Russian politicians suggest that Georgia and Russia will not have good relationship so long as Shevardnadze remains Georgia’s president. What do you think?
Batiashvili: The biggest goal for Russia in Georgia is to get rid of Shevardnadze, and to prove to Georgian people that if Shevardnadze is gone and a new, pro-Russian, political force comes to power then all of the problems that complicate the relationship between Georgia and Russia will suddenly be solved. This is pure nonsense, of course. We all recall, when in early period of Shevardnadze’s rule, Georgia chose, briefly, a pro-Russian course. A number of pro-Russian Ministers, including Vardiko Nadebaidze in Defense and Igor Giorgadze in State Security, were appointed, and Georgia even joined the CIS and was ready to permit Russian forces to stay for 25 years�what did we get for all this? Nothing! To base our national security and territorial integrity on these primitive claims from Russia is silliness. Our future is dependent on economic strength, on political stability, and on building up our armed forces, which will be the only real guarantor for Georgia’s territorial integrity in the future.

EurasiaNet: In addition to serving as Defense Committee chairman, you also are one of the leaders of a dominant pro-U.S. political force in Georgian politics. If the New Rights Party were to be in charge of Georgia today, how would it act? Would its policies differ significantly from those that the current government is undertaking?
Batiashvili: In terms of responding to Russia, our actions would probably be the same. For example, it was Shevardnadze’s command to the Georgian forces, that even under attack from Abkhaz side in Kodori, our forces had to mount only a minimal response, to ensure that the situation in Marukhi would not escalate into a war.

However, there is much to do in terms of strengthening the Georgian hold on Kodori. As well, in Pankisi, I think we probably would have started to arrest criminals, both Georgian and foreign, a long time ago. Our government’s inaction regarding the Pankisi problem, which first and foremost possess criminal danger to Georgia, has given Russia an excuse, a pretext, to pressure Georgia.

In general, for our party, national security is the critical issue for Georgia’s future. Our party, and its leader here in Parliament, David Gamkrelidze, believes that questions of national security and military reform require a wholly new conception -- based on the geopolitical realities of our region. This is the conception that our party is working to develop. The initiative to have me be elected Chairman of the Defense Committee was precisely to help advance the military reform and the relationship with the United States and NATO. I decided to accept this position based on our party’s belief that there is nothing more important for the country’s future than securing its independence and sovereignty.

EurasiaNet: Could you speak specifically about the sort of reforms that you would like to implement?
Batiashvili: We need to overcome the psychological barrier that prevents reform in the Ministry of Defense. We require serious staff changes so that people who oppose reform are removed�we can come up with a wonderful structure, but so long as you have the present staff in the ministry, nothing will change. Georgia is receiving advice from a variety of sources�NATO, foreign national security advisors, and others. All recommendations are the same�Georgia must cut the size of the army, to make it mobile and no larger than what Georgia can afford. In addition to the structural changes, the civil control of the armed forces is critical�Parliament’s oversight role is important and the defense minister must be a civilian. The relationship that currently exits between the General Staff, the defense minister, and the services needs to be changed. We need to reform and reorganize the military education system. Our committee, I hope, will be the force that will move these stalled reforms forward.

To bring about these changes, we must move beyond political intrigue. Over the last several months, many news stories appeared in the Georgian press alleging that our Parliamentary leader, David Gamkrelidze, wants to be defense minister, and all of our actions are somehow connected to bringing this about. I must say here, yet again, because I do not want my calls for reform to be misconstrued that these allegations are absolute nonsense.

Editor�s Note: Irakly Areshidze is a Visiting Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies in Washington. Views expressed in this analysis are those of the author and those interview, and not of the institutions with which the author is affiliated.

The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.