DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THE TAJIKISTAN GOVERNMENT
Anthony White

At the current time, Tajik authorities are engaged in all-encompassing political maneuvering. During the past two years, Afghanistan's Minister of Defense, Ahmad Shah Massoud, has increased his interaction with the Kulyab-based leadership of Tajikistan. Already in 1988 Ahmad Shah Massoud announced his intention to create an independent Tajik state - Greater Khorasan - including northern provinces of Afghanistan and a portion of Central Asia, including Samarkand and Bukhara. In the intervening period, when in Afghanistan the Government of Rabanni had been formed and he became Minister of Defense, he forgot somewhat about the original objective, but with the near-ouster of the Rabanni Government, Ahmad Shah Massoud actively started prosecuting his earlier goal.

Utilizing the argument of the ethnic identity of Tajiks in northern Afghanistan with those in the Kulyab region of Tajikistan and operating through the Head of the Afghanistan Department of Tajikistan's Ministry of National Security (a Kulyabi placed in his post by M. Ubaydullaev), he established direct contracts with M. Ubaydullaev and E. Rakhmonov. The latter two leaders, during the past two years, have been meeting with Ahmad Shah Massoud no less that once or twice a month. It was Ahmad Shah Massoud who authored the scenario for the reconciliation of the Kulyab leadership with the recalcitrant Islamic opposition. The main objective of this plan is the strengthening of the Kulyab faction by admission into the Government of representatives of the Karategin Valley and reducing the quantity of leaders and representatives of the Leninabad Oblast' in the Government. Ahmad Shah Massoud, planning the creation during the first stage of autonomous northern Afghan provinces in which Tajiks reside, desperately needs that Tajikistan's leadership will be represented by persons from the former Kulyab Oblast', since only they can guarantee for Ahmad Shah Massoud a transparent Tajik-Afghan border across which Ahmad Shah Massoud will be able, unimpeded, to transport weapons, military supplies and large quantities of narcotics, proceeds from the sale of the latter he can use for the purchase of more weapons and military supplies.

Only in such circumstances, Ahmad Shah Massoud can create autonomous northern provinces in Afghanistan and exercise ever more influence on southern and central Tajikistan. E. Rakhmonov and representatives of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) agreed to the plan devised by Ahmad Shah Massoud. In order to bring to life the plan of Ahmad Shah Massoud regarding the union of Afghan Tajiks with those in southern and central Afghanistan on the part of the Kulyab-based leadership of Tajikistan, principally through M. Ubaydullaev, a broad-based "buying" of Russian Government and military representatives of Russia based in Dushanbe was initiated.

Still in 1994, the Commander of the Russian Border Forces in Tajikistan, Chechulin, received US $2 million from the Kulyabi leadership so that he, through the Commander of Russia's Border Forces, General Nikolaev, would persuade Russia's President that only the Kulyabi President of Tajikistan would be a reliable partner for Russia. As time has shown, the method adopted by the Kulyabis worked in that the Russians installed E. Rakhmonov as Tajikistan's President.

Having consolidated their power, the Kulyabis started buying other Russian officials who happened to visit Tajikistan. For example, in May 1996 in Dushanbe Yuri Baturin, at that time Russian's National Security Adviser, visited Tajikistan for a few days. M. Ubaydullaev was responsible for taking care of Baturin. He took Baturin to the picturesque Vorzob Valley a number of times, where he organized huge banquets with plentiful spirits and young girls. E. Rakhmonov personally flew with Baturin in a helicopter for hunting, and M. Ubaydullaev, before saying farewell, handed over to Baturin a briefcase containing either $150,000 or $200,000, having first given his underlings orders to secretly videotape the exchange. Following his arrival in Moscow, Baturin actively lobbied for the Kulyabi clan in Tajikistan before Russia's political leadership.

M. Ubaydullaev also took under his wing the Head of the Special Department of Russia's Federal Security Service, Yakimenko. In exchange, Yakimenko, in his classified reports to the FSS in Moscow, always lobbies for the interests of the Kulyabi faction of the Tajik Government. According to existing information, M. Ubaydullaev has already supplied Yakimenko with not less that $600,000 in cash. Yakimenko is well aware that M. Ubaydullaev actively transports large quantities of narcotics to Russia and onwards to Europe but fails to report this fact to the FSS and has even attempted to justify M. Ubaydullaev's activities. At one point he admitted that M. Ubaydullaev was a "good guy" in that he spent a part of the proceeds from narcotics trafficking on improving the city of Dushanbe.

In addition to the outright "buying" of foreign representatives in Tajikistan, the Kulyab leadership has been known to use other forms of coercion and compromise. For example, the following method is widely used: a small drug trafficking route is organized which is subsequently transferred to Russian military personnel in Dushanbe. M. Ubaydullaev managed in this fashion to involve the leadership of Russia's military - i.e. Tarasenko and Zavarzin - in the drug smuggling business. In this fashion, at M. Ubaydullaev's request, a certain Yusuf became a trusted associate of Tarasenko, who was able to enter Tarasenko's office at any time and, with his consent, obtained the right to use a helicopter no less than 2-3 times a month. He flew to Kalaykhumb, picked up drugs readied for Tarasenko and brought them to Dushanbe. Thereafter, Tarasenko would transport them to Moscow using various channels. The military hospital of the Russian Border Forces has been used actively for this purpose. The drugs are transported on the bodies of so-called "injured persons" and in coffins into which bodies of deceased military personnel are packed. At the hospital, Tarasenko was actively assisted in transporting drugs to Russia by the Head of Supplies of the hospital. E. Rakhmonov, in his inner circle, has stated that the more foreign - particularly military - personnel are involved in narcotics trafficking, the stronger and more durable will be the power of Kulyabis in Tajikistan.

As regards the former Ambassador of Russia in Tajikistan Senkevich, E. Rakhmonov and M. Ubaydullaev cleverly exploited his various weaknesses. Seeing that Senkevich had taken generously to drink, they ordered to their underlings to give Senkevich enormous amounts of alcohol wherever he might be. The bills were paid for by M. Ubaydullaev. Nevertheless, following one bout of forced intoxication organized by M. Ubaydullaev, Senkevich appeared at Dushanbe airport barely cogent and with unbuttoned trousers. This concerted intoxication campaign waged against the Russian Ambassador compromised Russia's image in Tajikistan and made the Ambassador visibly dependent on M. Ubaydullaev. It is also known that, since 1993 and up to his departure in the autumn of 1996, the Ambassador had received $10,000/month from the Tajik Government.

Facts concerning regular or periodic payments of cash from Tajik Government officials to Russian officials are widely known in Tajik Government and near-Government circles, so the illusion has been created of an all-powerful duo of Rakhmonov and Ubaydullaev. It is without doubt that, at the beginning of August 1996, a few days before the inauguration of the President of the Russian Federation, D.B. Ryurikov, then holding the post of Adviser to President Yeltsin, received $300,000. He also received $150,000 in December 1996. On 13 December 1996, at Dushanbe airport prior to his departure for Moscow, E.N. Mikhailov, Plenipotentiary Adviser to the President of Russia in Tajikistan, received from M. Ubaydullaev $150,000. Russia's Minister of Defense, P. Grachev (former Russian Defense Minister), A. Kozyrev (former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia), and A.S. Chernyshov (former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia), each received $500,000 in Tajikistan six weeks prior to Russia's Presidential elections. Grachev and Kozyrev also received gold bars and works of art. Less was paid to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in Tajikistan Oblov, who received two payments of $50,000 each. The Head of the Parliamentary Committee for CIS Affairs Tikhonov, in 1996, received $100,000 from the Tajik leadership, and the former Minister for CIS Affairs (now Governor of Kemerovo), A. Tuleev, at the end of 1996, received $150,000.

All of the above facts indicate that the regime of Rakhmonov and M. Ubaydullaev is kept in power thanks to the lobbying efforts of corrupted high officials of the Russian Government.

Among the population there is the feeling that unpaid pensions, stipends and wages intended for the people of Tajikistan are being paid to foreign leaders, which accounts for the unflagging support on the part of the latter for a clearly unpopular Rakhmonov, who has brought onto his people hunger, demise and epidemics. All this has consolidated popular opinion against Russia, the West and democracy. The silence of Moscow and of foreign capitals regarding the uprising in Khojent prison on 17 April 1997 - because of hunger and the ensuing massacre of the prisoners, which was followed by mass repressions organized by the Kulyabi leadership following a faked attempt on the life of E. Rakhmonov - is regarded by the population as an act having the approval of Russia, the participation of Moscow and the tacit approval of the West.

Although the May 1997 meeting and discussions in Dushanbe of three leaders of Farsi-speaking countries - the practically powerless and nearly deposed Rabanni, the then outgoing Rafsanjani in Iran and the formal head of State of Tajikistan Rakhmonov - was publicized as a huge international success, since the results were obviously directed against the strategic interests of Tajikistan, Russia and the West. Great Khorasan could only arise as a result of wars in which not only Tajikistan and Afghanistan but other countries, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran, would be drawn into. Perhaps the inclusion of other countries, including Turkey, in this conflict would occur. In this manner, the plan initiated by Ahmad Shah Massoud would threaten peace and create a permanent theatre for military actions in Central Asia.

It is know for a fact that, after a confidential meeting of Rakhmonov, Rabbani and Rafsanjani in Dushanbe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. Nazarov, in discussions with Tajik nationalist and intellectual P. Masov, in response to a question regarding the possible reaction of neighboring countries and Russia, said the following: "For example, Uzbekistan would be unable to resist because we know how to fight and they do not. And as for Russia, you know that we determine their policies in principle. That means we will tell them where to go".