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Uzbekistan after the Terrorist Attacks in the USA: Between the Threat from the South and Pressure from the North
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and proclaiming Osama bin Laden the main suspect and Afghanistan a stronghold of the terrorist number one, the countries of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, are facing a difficult choice. This choice implies how, on the one hand, to satisfy claims of the most powerful players on the Central Asian geopolitical arena, i. e., the raging United States and Russia biding its time, and, on the other hand, to protect oneself in the future from potential threats of one's southern neighbor - the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The fact that in the light of America's imminent military operation in Afghanistan Uzbekistan becomes one of the key countries in the region can explain the apprehensive position of the Uzbek government.
Already on the day following the terrorist attacks the President
of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov expressed sympathy to the American
people in the letter addressed to George Bush, saying, "We
resolutely condemn the barbarian action of the terrorists
and we are convinced that those who are responsible will be
found and punished. At this dramatic moment we become increasingly
conscious of the importance to unite our efforts in countering
this terrible evil, terrorism. Mr. President, Uzbekistan once
again confirms its resolution to continue its active cooperation
with the United States in fighting this common threat" (1).
On 13 September the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan
made a statement to remind that it was Uzbekistan that had
been the first among the UN member countries to put forward
the initiative of setting up an International Anti-Terrorist
Center, which, unfortunately, had not been further developed.
The statement further said that in the light of the recent
events, "Uzbekistan considers its duty to address the UN Secretary
General with proposal to take effective and immediate action
to establish an International Anti-Terrorist Center" (2).
Since then the events began to develop catastrophically fast,
as the US authorities unambiguously argued for an instant
and powerful revenge against terrorists and countries supporting
them. After President Bush received support of the American
people and the Congress, and the Taleban threatened to take
vengeance on any contiguous country that provides its territory
and airspace to help the United States (3),
Uzbekistan faced with the problem of identifying its position
in this situation. It has become clear that the establishment
of a new entity, the International Anti-Terrorist Center,
alone will not solve the problem, and now the whole point
is a threat of a large-scale regional military conflict. In
a situation like this Uzbekistan is required to make an unambiguous
decision and take either of the two sides involved in the
confrontation. It appears that this choice is not going to
be simple, because besides the United States, there is another
player traditionally present in Central Asian political arena
- Russia which is taking its time deciding its position. On
September 18 the Secretary of the Russian Security Council
Vladimir Rushailo arrived in Kazakhstan to hold a meeting
with the President Nursultan Nazarbaev. During the meeting
it was emphasized that "some countries and international organizations
in discussing the issue of combating international terrorism
often get carried away with questions about inadequacy of
using force and human rights". "Now we can see what consequences
this has led to", said Rushailo (4).
Clearly, these words transparently implied that the earlier
criticism of the Russia's operations in Chechnya expressed
by the European countries and the USA had been erroneous.
Rushailo is also to meet with other Central Asian leaders.
Russia's activism is apparently caused by the ambiguity of
the situation. On the other hand, Russia cannot but support
the America's desire to avenge, because any other attitude
would be misunderstood and not well received by most Western
countries. On the other hand, the prospects of providing the
United States with a beachhead in Central Asia, going as far
as setting up permanent military bases in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
carry the risk for Russia to completely loose its influence
in the region. It is, probably, no accident that the LDPR
[Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] faction in the Russia's
Gosudarstvennaya Duma [the Parliament] adopted an extremely
anti-American position demanding that "the Taleban, facing
this complicated situation, be supported", and its leader,
Vladimir Zhirinovskii openly declared that in this conflict
Russia must take "the side of Muslims, not America" (5).
Launching such ideas into public circulation through the LDPR,
the Russian authorities, probably, want to see how these ides
resound.
It should be noted that a year ago the Uzbek leadership's
attitude toward the Taleban government was quite positive.
At that time President Karimov spoke of the Taleban as of
the force that might give Afghanistan so long-awaited peace
and stability; Russian media, ceaselessly talking about threat
coming from the new Afghan regime, were accused of "trying
to create panic among the region's population and give the
international community a distorted picture of the local events"
(6). Also, just over a year ago Russia
tested the public reaction to the idea of potential "preventive
strikes" aimed at the terrorist centers in Afghanistan; the
ides was voiced by the Assistant to the Russian President
Sergei Yastrzhembskii (7) and caused
a tide of criticism in the Uzbek media.
Therefore, reaction to the global situation after the terrorist attacks in the USA and unbending resoluteness of the Pres. Bush's administration to punish the terrorists and countries supporting them - Afghanistan in the first place - has turned out to be rather ambivalent for Central Asian countries and Russia. Russia, whose attitude toward the Taleban was so resolute just over a year ago, is now biding its time, waiting, taking consultation with the leaders of the Central Asian states and is prepared only "to share information" with the US. On the contrary, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which one year ago were loyal to the Taleban, are now almost ready to provide their territory and airspace for retaliation strikes against Afghanistan.
A split in the Russian Parliament over the issue of military
operation in Afghanistan, as well as the temporizing position
of Russia explicitly demonstrate the ambivalence of the situation.
Russia cannot but join the justified anger of the United States,
but it also fears to loose what has been left of its influence
in Central Asia. Whereas Uzbekistan, seeking to protect itself
from both the future threat from the South and Russia trying
to assert itself in the region, has also found itself in the
ambiguous situation. By allowing the American to permanently
station on its territory (in the form of military bases),
Uzbekistan risks to acquire a serious enemy - Russia. By not
allowing the United States to use its territory and airspace,
Uzbekistan risks to loose financial and political support
of America in the future. This is what accounts for a pause
held by the Uzbek government in what seems to be an obvious
matter - helping the USA. Unless the Unites States give up
the idea of retaliation, sooner or later this choice must
be made. And it appears that this choice will not be in favor
of Russia.
Footnotes
(1)"Pravda Vostoka", 14 September,
2001.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Khabar Television, Almaty, in Kazakh, 17 September, 2001
- In: BBC Monitoring, 17 September, 2001.
(4) Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency, Almaty, in Russian, 18
September, 2001. - In: BBC Monitoring, 18 September, 2001.
(5) Television Channel TV-6, Moscow, Russia. The news program
"Seychas", 20 September, 2001.
(6) "Narodnoe slovo", 28 September, 2000.
(7) "Commersant Daily", 25 May, 2000.
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