Analyzing the targets selected in Afghanistan during the first wave of attacks provides insight into the political bargaining done by the United States in order to bring Uzbekistan, Russia, and Pakistan into the anti-terrorism coalition.
When talks of military strikes against the Taliban began, Uzbekistan saw the situation as an opportunity to enlist US help in crushing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has waged a three-year insurgent campaign to overthrow President Islam Karimov's government. In exchange for allowing U.S. forces to use Uzbekistan's military facilities, Karimov likely insisted that the U.S. take out IMU bases in Taliban-controlled territory in Afghanstan.
Predictably, several IMU facilities in the Balkh and Kunduz provinces near the Uzbek border were apparently among the first targets hit in Afghanistan. Local media reports and information provided by the Pentagon suggested heavy activity near the Gortepe district of Kunduz, where an IMU troop garrison under the command of Juma Namangami is located. An IMU training center in Dasht-e-Shur was also apparently hit in the first night of attacks.
Similarly, in order to secure cooperation from Russia, the Bush administration appears to have reached an understanding with President Vladamir Putin on the Russian military campaign in Chechnya. Again, the target list during the first days of the military campaign is instructive here. Several facilities that Russia claims are used by Chechen separatists have already been struck, including several military bases in and around the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, and training facilities in the Hakrez and Mirbachakot districts of the southwestern Kandahar province.
In addition, President Bush has changed the American diplomatic posture on the Chechen issue, essentially corroborating Russia's long-held contention that Osama bin Laden and the Taliban are partially responsible for fueling the insurgency in Chechnya. This change in policy is designed to deflect attention away from Moscow's alleged human rights abuses in Chechnya in exchange for Russian support in the anti-terrorism effort.
With regard to Pakistan, insight into the political deal struck between President Pervez Musharraf and the United States can be gained by considering the targets that have not been attacked. According to various news reports, bombing raids have not targeted key Taliban defensive positions around Kabul. Taliban defensive capabilities have not been hit hard so as to stall any advance by the opposition Northern Alliance on the Afghan capital. [For more information, see the Eurasia Insight archive.]
The restraint shown by the United States can be seen as a concession to Pakistan, as Islamabad has long viewed Afghanistan as a vital sphere of influence that provides strategic depth in its relations with India. Pakistan's vital security interests are therefore threatened by the premature fall of the Taliban, as the anti-Pakistani Northern Alliance is the only group capable of taking power at the present time, should Taliban authority suddenly collapse. President Musharraf could have stipulated that his country's support for US anti-terrorism actions is contingent on the Taliban remaining in power until a viable transition government agreeable to Pakistan can fill the vacuum.
The United States is reaping the benefits of politically astute target selection. Tashkent has reportedly allowed the United States to launch offensive operations from Uzbekistan, Russia has used its influence over Tajikistan to get that country to open its territory to American and British Special Operations units, and President Musharraf has opened two Pakistani airfields to the United States.
Yet despite this early success, backroom power politics will become increasingly complicated as the campaign progresses. Central Asia is one of the most geopolitically volatile areas of the world, and Russia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan all see Afghanistan as a strategic prize.
Neighboring states and regional powers are already jockeying for position as attention starts to focus on the shape of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political order. Russia and Uzbekistan would prefer to see the Taliban overthrown as quickly as possible. Both have been strong backers of the Northern Alliance, and would like to see it back in power in Kabul. Pakistan, on the other hand, is intent on having any post-Taliban government in Afghanistan amenable to Pakistani interests.
These strategic goals, while not mutually exclusive, will not be easily integrated into a comprehensive strategy. Political quid-pro-quos between the United States. and coalition members will become increasingly difficult to execute, given the divergent interests of key partners in the campaign against terrorism.
Artie McConnell is a research fellow with the National Defense Council Foundation in Alexandria, VA who specializes in Central Asian affairs.
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