Central Asia and the South Caucasus are important for Turkey's interests in terms of the regions' internal conflicts, Russian influence, energy resources and trade opportunities. Following the disintegration of the USSR and relative weakening of Russia, many officials in Ankara had high hopes of establishing close ties with the newly-independent states, making Turkey a leading actor in the former Soviet southern periphery. Turkey's growing interest in the region quickly led to the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency and the setting up of annual "Turkic summits," bringing together the presidents of Turkey and all other post-Soviet Turkic republics. The late Turkish president Turgut Ozal entertained a sweeping project that included a vibrant Turkic Common Market and a powerful Turkic Trade and Development Bank.

After Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze called for a regional stability pact, Ankara proposed the concept of the Caucasus Stability Pact as a means to settle the region's many conflicts and accommodate sometimes contradictory interests. A so-called "Turkish model" (based on the country's imperfect but seemingly workable market economy and somewhat restrictive parliamentary democracy) was projected to the post-Soviet states as a roadmap for their transition. The Western governments encouraged both Ankara's involvement and spreading of the "Turkish model," since the likely alternatives seemed to be an Islamist-based Iranian model or simply a return to Russian domination.

However, Turkey appears to have failed to play a leadership role in the post-Soviet space. As many regional analysts contend, Turkey's recent activism in Eurasia is real but fragile. Several factors explain this failure. Firstly, the post-Soviet states have been wary of Ankara acting as a new "big brother" while they just escaped the clutches of another big brother. The newly independent Turkic states in particular – Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – were seeking to develop and consolidate their own national identities. One commentator suggested that Turkey's "excessive emphasis on commonalities" between the Turks and the Turkic states' peoples has even caused resentment in Central Asia. The Caucasus and Central Asian states obviously preferred more limited and more equal relations with Ankara. Their leaders (particularly in Azerbaijan) were also suspicious of Turkey's attempts to influence their domestic politics. Besides, these countries were unwilling to bind themselves exclusively to Turkey-dominated organizations and eager to secure political and economic support from other states including Russia and Iran.

Secondly, Turkey is a relatively poor country. Indeed, Turkey's more ambitious regional schemes, including Black Sea cooperation and efforts in Central Asia and the Caucasus, have been hindered by Ankara's limited ability to fund sweeping geopolitical projects. The recent severe economic crisis additionally cast doubt on the value of Turkish connection.

Thirdly, Moscow did lose direct control over its former borderlands but Russia's influence didn't disappear. The presence of Russian troops in a number of countries (Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan and now Kyrgyzstan), powerful economic levers (gas and electricity deliveries) and the ability to manipulate regional ethnic conflicts compel the local leaders to take heed of Russia's wishes.

Fourthly, a "Turkish model" appears to have lost much of its appeal both for the post-Soviet states and the West. The democratic component present in the Turkish system proved not so attractive to the authoritarian leaders in the Caucasus and Central Asia who obviously didn't have much interest in fostering broader political participation and pluralism. Arguably, the newly independent republics' rulers styled their regimes more on the old Soviet communist system than on Turkey's. For its part, the West has also reconsidered the usefulness of the "Turkish model," having realized that the initial fears concerning Iran's influence had been exaggerated.

In addition, Turkey's identity-based foreign policy didn't appear to help settle the South Caucasus conflicts, most notably the one between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead, Turkey actively supported Baku on the grounds of common ethnicity and culture. However, even some Turkish commentators suggest a more far-sighted policy would have developed closer links with both countries, thus possibly reducing the efforts of Yerevan and the Armenian lobby in the West to wage a propaganda campaign against Turkey. To ease the tension between Armenia and Turkey, some Turkish analysts argue, Ankara might have suggested that the oil and gas export pipeline routes run across Armenia rather than following a roundabout path.

Finally, Eurasia's energy riches prompted the West and the United States in particular to opt for a more direct involvement rather than rely on the regional proxies like Turkey. The deployment of American troops in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) and the Caucasus (Georgia) within the framework of the US-led war on terror has underscored the strategic decision to engage the region more actively than had been taken even prior to the September 11 attacks.

This is part II of a series. Read part III.