Armenia formalizes closer ties with the West
It is now the law of the land to seek EU integration.

January 2025 may go down as Armenia’s geopolitical inflection point, a time when Yerevan decisively moved to shun its longtime protector Russia and pin its political and economic future on integration with Western institutions, thus scrambling the strategic balance in the Caucasus.
Armenian officials have taken steps in recent days to formalize the country’s improving relationship with the United States and European Union. On January 14, US and Armenian diplomats signed a strategic partnership agreement, paving the way for stronger trade, strategic and political ties between the two states.
Days earlier, the Armenian government finalized legislation authorizing efforts to qualify the country for European Union membership. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said the EU Integration Act adopted January 9 would mark a turning point in the country’s history, but cautioned the EU accession process would be arduous, requiring consistent political will and popular support.
“Adopting the law doesn’t literally mean Armenia is joining the EU because that cannot be done through a law or government decision; a decision on that [accession] can only be made through a referendum,” the prime minister stated.
On January 13, Pashinyan had a phone conversation with European Council President António Costa, with discussions focusing on the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. Efforts to reach a durable settlement to the two countries’ decades-old conflict recently hit a snag, when Baku revived a demand for extraterritorial rights for a land connection between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave.
In comments posted on social media, Costa said he “expressed the EU’s commitment to further strengthening our partnership [with Armenia] based on common values and to deepening cooperation across all sectors, including security, the economy, people-to-people contacts, democratic institutions, and resilience.”
Armenia’s efforts to tighten ties with the EU and United States are the outcome of a souring of relations with Russia: many Armenians felt betrayed by the Kremlin for not fulfilling security guarantees during the last stages of the Second Karabakh War, which ended with Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the contested territory in late 2023.
For most of the post-Soviet era, Armenia had relied heavily on Russia for economic and strategic support. Traditionally, Armenia was considered firmly in Moscow’s orbit as part of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). But since suffering a decisive defeat in Karabakh, Pashinyan’s government has reconsidered the value of the country’s relations with Russia.
The Kremlin has reacted to Armenia’s moves with a characteristic combination of vexation and nonchalance. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on January 14 said Russia still considers Armenia as a close partner while disparaging the United States as a troublemaker bent on stirring up conflict in the Caucasus.
“The United States, of course, is trying in every possible way to drag down new countries,” Peskov said at a press briefing, adding that Washington has “has never played a particularly stabilizing role in the South Caucasus.”
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov adopted a more measured tone in commenting on Armenia’s relations with the EU and United States, characterizing the Armenian-US strategic partnership as the “sovereign decision of two states.” He emphasized that such agreements do not oblige “one or another participant to oppose a third country.”
One immediate question arising out of Armenia’s EU Integration Act is the country’s future in the Moscow-dominated EAEU. Armenian officials, while suspending the country‘s membership in the CSTO, have said they have no plans to leave the EAEU.
Russian officials, meanwhile, have emphatically stated that Yerevan cannot enjoy the best of both economic worlds.
“The EAEU and the EU are incompatible. Both unions imply the absence of customs borders and the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overshuk stated shortly after Armenia’s approval of the EU Integration Act. “Membership in the EAEU is a privilege, while membership in the EU is comparable to buying a ticket on the Titanic due to the economic and social problems in the bloc.”
Overshuk went on to predict Armenians would face drastically higher costs for consumer goods and energy if the country left the EAEU.
To a certain extent, the EU Integration Act marks the end of the beginning for Yerevan in its efforts to gain full membership. Beyond the formidable domestic reform challenges of bringing Armenian legislation into alignment with EU standards, the country must make peace with Azerbaijan. The prospects of a peace deal now seem more distant than perhaps a few months ago, but the process has proven prone to sudden shifts. For example, if existing tension lingers between Azerbaijan and Russia over the Kremlin’s failure to admit any responsibility for the crash of an Azerbaijani airliner that was accidentally shot down by air defense forces in Chechnya, Baku might be inclined to soften its negotiating positions vis-à-vis Armenia.
Meanwhile, the return of Donald Trump to the White House later in January raises questions about the future US-Armenian partnership. Many Armenians are hopeful that Trump’s return will accelerate efforts to expand bilateral relations, citing comments made by the president-elect prior to the November elections that he would “protect persecuted Christians.” At the same time, political observers expect that the Trump administration’s foreign policy will not prioritize the South Caucasus.
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