Armenia scouts path toward EU accession
Public trust of Armenians toward Russia cratering.

Having fallen out with Russia, Armenia is cultivating the European Union as its new strategic partner. The European Parliament is reciprocating Armenian overtures to strengthen ties, but the stance of other EU institutions is harder to determine.
Buzz had been building in recent months that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government is serious about exploring the EU accession process. On March 9, in comments made on the sidelines of a diplomatic gathering in Turkey, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan publicly signaled Yerevan’s interest. “Many new opportunities are largely being discussed in Armenia nowadays and it will not be a secret if I say that includes membership in the European Union,” Turkey’s TRT channel quoted Mirzoyan as saying.
The European Parliament, the EU’s legislative branch, responded with a resolution March 13 endorsing the development of a closer relationship with Armenia, as well as urging a lasting peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “The European Union should respond positively and take full advantage of this potential geopolitical shift and help Armenia anchor itself more strongly in the community of democracies,” the resolution stated.
Pashinyan quickly picked up on the European Parliament’s action, calling for extensive public discussion on the prospect of EU membership. “This is another opportunity to discuss the vision for the future of Armenia,” Pashinyan said.
Russia’s long-standing image as protector of Armenian sovereignty crumbled in 2023 amid Azerbaijan’s reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the Karabakh defeat, Pashinyan has stepped up efforts to engage the United States and EU, searching for diplomatic and security support capable of offsetting Azerbaijan’s present and decided advantage in military power.
Tangible signs of Yerevan’s westward shift include a freeze on the country’s participation in the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization and Armenia’s ratification of the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, a move that exposes Russian leader Vladimir Putin to arrest on an ICC criminal warrant if he sets foot on Armenian territory.
And on March 19, news emerged that most Armenian banks will no longer accept cards connected to the Russian MIR payment system as of the end of March, severing a major financial connection between the two countries. For now, only one Armenian bank that is an affiliate of a Russian institution, VTB Bank, says it will continue to accept MIR cards, which are the Russian version of Visa and Mastercard. The ban on MIR cards is designed to conform with US sanctions against Russia.
EU membership would certainly provide the type of strategic “roof” that Armenia needs at present to reinforce its sovereignty. At the same time, potential membership, or even just participating in the accession process, would appear to force Yerevan to acknowledge the results of the second Karabakh war as permanent.
The European Parliament resolution repeatedly assailed the Kremlin’s recent behavior toward Armenia, noting at one point that “Russia’s alleged readiness to guarantee the security of Armenia has proven to be non-existent.” It added that Moscow is “seeking to undermine Armenian democratic credentials, and is spreading chaos and destabilization through continuous attempts at interference, including disinformation campaigns.”
Russia, meanwhile, has ratcheted up the vitriolic tone of its rhetoric. In one recent statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry assailed the West for trying to “turn Armenia into a tool of anti-Russian policy in the post-Soviet space.” That statement came in response to comments made by James Heappey, a top UK Defense Ministry official, who expressed Britain’s readiness to support Armenia “in case of threats from Russia.”
The parliamentary resolution additionally offered praise for Armenia’s “significant political changes in recent years,” citing The Economist’s 2023 Democracy Index in describing the country as “the leading democracy in the [Caucasus] region.” Such wording throws some shade on neighboring Georgia’s government, which has been widely accused of pursuing illiberal policies in recent years, thus complicating that nation’s EU accession bid.
Other EU institutions have warmed to the idea of closer ties with Armenia. In late February, for example, the EU Commissioner for International Partnerships Jutta Urpilainen stated that EU-Armenia relations had “never been stronger” than at present. Earlier in February, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, announced an “ambitious” plan to expand cooperation in such areas as visa liberalization, trade and security.
But the European Parliament resolution contained hints of divisions within the EU over Armenia and the Karabakh peace process. The resolution called on the EU Commission, for example, to back words with actions, urging the executive branch to develop specific programs to fulfill Borrell’s pledge about an “ambitious upgrade to the EU’s relations with Armenia.”
European MPs also said they strongly disagreed “with the tone of some recent statements by leaders of the Commission and the European Council congratulating [Azerbaijani] President Aliyev for his reelection [in February] without mentioning the absence of democracy in Azerbaijan and misleadingly qualifying Azerbaijan as a reliable partner.”
“These statements do not reflect the position of the European Union and should never have been made in the light of the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan,” the resolution added. The Commission’s actions appear aimed at achieving a balance between EU interest in closer relations with Armenia and a desire to enhance energy-related cooperation with Azerbaijan to reduce the union’s reliance of Russian oil and natural gas.
Public attitudes in Armenia, meanwhile, appear to be strengthening behind the government’s position. Perceptions about the EU are improving, even amid a deluge of mis- and disinformation about Pashinyan’s supposed perfidy, and the perils of cooperation with the West, being churned out by Russian media. A March poll conducted by the International Republican Institute showed increased trust in the EU and broad satisfaction with the direction of EU-Armenian relations, with over 80 percent of respondents saying they were happy with the current state of bilateral relations. The same poll showed a dramatic deterioration of public trust in Russia, with only 31 percent Armenians considering Armenian-Russian relations good, compared to 93 percent in 2019.
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