Internal and external conflict have indelibly shaped Armenia's political system, yet the country's political life is comparatively stable. Armenia, for example, is among the few former Soviet states that have experienced a peaceful transfer of executive authority. In 2003, the country has scheduled fresh presidential and parliamentary elections. Presidential hopefuls have already launched their campaigns, but many political analysts believe Robert Kocharian's re-election to be virtually assured.

In all, 15 political leaders have declared their intention to seek the presidency. Candidates are now in the process of gathering documentation needed to get on the ballot, including a petition signed by at least 35,000 citizens. Some candidates are expected to have trouble meeting these requirements and thus be disqualified.

The failure of the Kocharian's political opponents to nominate a single challenger means the incumbent will be difficult to beat in the presidential election, scheduled for February 19. Kocharian, who is not affiliated with any party, enjoys the firm support of several powerful political parties and state institutions, including the armed forces. Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian is managing his campaign.

Since the 1991 Soviet collapse, two factors – the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan and the 1999 parliament shooting incident – have exerted profound influence over Armenian politics. Both factors played an important role in Kocharian's own rise to power. The incumbent first gained political notoriety as the leader of Karabakh Armenians. Later, in 1998, he assumed the presidency, with the Armenian defense establishment's strong backing, following the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrosian, the country's first chief executive in the post-Soviet era.

During the war, Armenian forces established control over Karabakh, as well as over large areas of Azerbaijan proper. Since Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a 1994 ceasefire, the two countries have struggled to reach agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh's political status. Kocharian's administration has remained firm that any settlement must leave Karabakh outside of Azerbaijani jurisdiction. The talks now appear to have reached a stalemate, with the presidential elections both countries face in 2003 considered to be a major factor in the lack of progress.

The October 1999 parliament shootings left a number of key politicians, including the then prime minister and parliament speaker, dead. The incident at the same time enhanced Kocharian's own grip on power, as the assassinations created a leadership void in the political establishment. Kocharian's influence increased at the expense of parliament. The country remains consumed by the trial of the alleged parliament-shooting conspirators and the pursuit of those who masterminded the attack. Despite rumors to the contrary, investigators have so far failed to uncover convincing evidence that any political party or leader ordered the killings.

Kocharian, a popular symbol of nationalism and solidarity with Nagorno-Karabakh, saw his influence increase after the shootings in parliament. Nonetheless, he is still forced to play for the support of the dominant parliamentary bloc, led by the Republican Party, in order to govern effectively.

In addition to the February 19 presidential vote, Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on May 25. The president and his parliamentary coalition partners will face opposition from a number of parties. The Armenian National Movement (ANM) and smaller allied parties are currently a relatively weak force in Armenian politics, but rumors of former President Ter-Petrosian's run for office (now discounted) caused a temporary surge of interest.

The People's Party of Armenia (PPA) was also a significant force at one time, but has had difficulty recovering from the death of its leader and founder Karen Demirchian, the former parliament speaker, in the 1999 parliamentary shootings. His son, Stepan, who replaced him as party leader, is far less popular. Hanrapetutiun ("Republic"), another opposition party, consists primarily of Karabakh war volunteers (known as Yerkrapahs) who left the governing Republican Party to protest its handling of the inquiry into the parliamentary assassinations.

National Accord (NA) is a populist, leftist party led by Artashes Geghamian, the former Communist mayor of Yerevan. Finally there are the Communists, whose support has declined in recent years as their leader, Vladimir Darbinian, tries to shore up an aging constituency. Numerous smaller parties populate the opposition landscape as well.

None of these groups enjoys the electoral support or resources necessary to mount an effective independent campaign against Kocharian, the Republican Party and its parliamentary allies. This is especially true after the Republicans' strong showing in the local elections of October 2002, which, in Armenia's political equation, has raised their relative value in comparison to others in the ruling coalition. If they triumph again in the parliamentary elections set for May 2003, the Republicans will likely seek to enhance their influence over Kocharian and try to expand their role in governing.

The rise of the Republican Party may represent the opposition's greatest hope for success. The perpetual competition between the diverse members of Kocharian's coalition could provide an opening, but only if the opposition proves more unified than its rivals are.

In a tacit acknowledgement of their individual weaknesses, 16 opposition parties formed an alliance known as the People's Patriotic Union (PPU) in September 2002. However, in the run-up to the elections, it appeared that the survival of the PPU was already in doubt. Three of the constituent parties, National Accord, the Communists and Socialist Armenia, declared on November 21 their intention to field a candidate separate from the one chosen by the rest of the bloc.

While the parties' platforms initially seemed a good match – all three parties are left wing and pro-Russian – even this smaller union appeared to be in jeopardy. In late November, NA named its chairman Geghamian as a contender for the presidency, followed by the Communists' declaring Darbinian their candidate. These and other late additions brought the number of presidential hopefuls submitting applications by the December 6 deadline up to 15. By fielding so many candidates, the opposition may hope to prevent Kocharian from receiving an outright majority. In such a scenario, the most successful candidate would face the president in a runoff election, presumably with the support of other opposition forces.

As the race heats up and the playing field gets more crowded, the opposition can be expected to highlight the incumbent administration's failure to stem corruption and improve living standards. Kocharian, meanwhile, is expected to claim credit for the country's steady economic growth. More importantly, Kocharian will have the support of the governmental and security apparatus and most of the media. Control of the press is crucial, as Armenian state-owned media outlets are still much stronger than private, and even the majority of the latter are run by pro-presidential forces.

Another intriguing factor in the campaign is the bid of Raffi Hovhannisian, the popular American-born Armenian who served as the country's first foreign minister after independence. He has been denied official status as a candidate on the grounds that he gained Armenian citizenship in 2001, whereas a presidential candidate must be a citizen and reside in Armenia for at least 10 years prior to a bid. Hovhannisian, who argues that he has applied for Armenian citizenship repeatedly since 1992 but faced obstruction from both administrations, has taken his case to court and may add an element of unpredictability to the race.

Given the overwhelming advantage of the incumbent and the relative weakness of his adversaries, Kocharian seems well positioned to win re-election. If his coalition remains strong through the presidential campaign and elections, most of the opposition parties will be seriously weakened and have little chance of entering parliament in May, with the possible exception of Hanrapetutiun and the NA. It is likely that a group of seats will be awarded to newly created pro-Kocharian parties. Given the country's recent political history, however, new opposition groups can be expected to emerge as a result of disagreements within the ruling coalition. Whether they will have better success than the current crop remains to be seen.