Caution ought to be exercised in examining the possible Iraqi connection to terrorist acts in the United States. There are at least three possible explanations for Atta's Prague meetings that do not conform to conventional wisdom. First, Atta may have been in touch with the Iraqis to purchase specific items from them that were not readily available to al Qaeda. Iraqi intelligence may well have been fairly certain that Atta would use whatever he bought from them for anti-American purposes without knowing the actual details of the plot. Nor would there have been any reason for Atta or bin Laden to provide such details to the Iraqis.

Second, although Atta appears to have unquestionably been an al Qaeda operative, he may have also been selling information or services to Baghdad on the side.

A third possibility is the most intriguing. Most analysts assume that Atta's meeting with an Iraqi agent suggests that al Qaeda had ties to Saddam's regime. It is possible, though, that whoever Atta met with may have been seeking al Qaeda's support against Saddam. Alternatively, Atta may have been trying to assess whether al Qaeda could work with Iraqi partners to attack Saddam. This possibility is not farfetched. Saddam has opponents. Many of those inside Iraq opposed to Saddam are probably attracted to Islamic fundamentalist concepts.

Indeed, considering how ruthlessly Saddam deals with anyone whom he suspects of opposing him, a highly secretive organization such as al Qaeda might be perceived by Saddam's domestic opponents as the only type of organization capable of bringing about change in Iraq.

Whatever the explanation for Atta's Prague meetings, US strategic planners and the American public must avoid a rush to judgement. Just because both al Qaeda and Baghdad are anti-American does not mean that they are allied. Bin Laden's associates, after all, have denounced Saddam for being a kafir (infidel) and for his devotion to secular Arab nationalism.

Of course, ideological opponents can cooperate under certain circumstances-but usually not for long. One, if not both, of the parties entering such agreements almost always does so with the intention of turning on the other side later, when they have achieved their common goal, if not sooner. As much as Americans would like to see Saddam toppled, they need to be aware that the forces in the strongest position to replace Saddam do not necessarily hold friendly views of the United States.