In trying to ensure a dynastic political transition in Azerbaijan, President Heidar Aliyev is pursuing a variant of a succession model developed in Russia by former Russian leader Boris Yeltsin. Whether this method ultimately proves successful in Azerbaijan remains to be seen. Developments in Azerbaijan are being watched closely to see if they provide insight into future successions in the Caucasus and beyond.

The political transition underway in Azerbaijan is arguably the most meaningful succession of the post-Soviet era in the Caucasus. With President Aliyev remaining hospitalized at the Cleveland Clinic, his son, Ilham, has been placed in positioned to assume the presidency following the October 15 election.

So far, past experience has played a large role in shaping Azerbaijan's political present. A democratic tradition has not had sufficient time to take root in Azerbaijan since the Soviet Union's demise. Elections in Azerbaijan, as elsewhere in the Caucasus, have been marred by fraud. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The preeminent objective of incumbent authority appears to be retaining power at all costs.

Given these set of variables, Aliyev's inner circle seems to believe that the Yeltsin model offers the best hope for a successful dynastic succession. Under the Yeltsin model, the president resigned on the last day of 1999, allowing his interim successor, Vladimir Putin, to run for president in March 2000 as an incumbent, thus making all the perquisites of state power available to his campaign. Accordingly, Putin easily secured a full presidential term.

As Yeltsin did with Putin, who served as prime minister before assuming the interim presidency, the elder Aliyev has done with his son. The Azerbaijani president in recent years has integrated Ilham, into the ruling New Azerbaijan Party's leadership and the country's governing hierarchy. Following the sharp deterioration of President Aliyev's health this spring, Ilham found himself in August appointed prime minister – first in line for presidential succession under the Azerbaijani constitution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

The elder Aliyev remains in nominal charge of Azerbaijan's government. His aides have given no inclination that the ailing president feels inclined to step down in favor of his son. Instead, the preferred transition would seem to have Ilham winning the presidential election as the ruling party candidate.

For the Yeltsin-Putin variant to work in Azerbaijan, Ilham still must overcome several substantial obstacles. Firstly, Azerbaijani opposition parties are mounting a vigorous presidential campaign. The two leading opposition presidential candidates – Etibar Mamedov and Isa Gambar – both believe that in a fair election they could trounce the younger Aliyev. The opposition also vows to mount large-scale protests if it believes the election results are falsified.

Secondly, and less discussed, is the potential for opposition to Ilham to form from within the ruling establishment. There were signs, especially shortly after Ilham was named premier, that elements within the New Azerbaijan Party favored the older Soviet practices of democratic centralism and collective leadership to secure its power. During Soviet succession processes, democratic centralism helped to keep the Communist Party's power from being undermined by internal conflicts. In an additional effort to minimize intra-party power struggles, Communist leaders relied on a collective leadership during political transition periods.

Recent signs suggest that the New Azerbaijan Party machinery has mobilized behind Ilham's presidential candidacy. Still, it cannot be assumed that the ruling party has anointed Ilham as its paramount leader. Instead, it may be recognizing him as a "front man for collective leadership."

The Soviet experience shows that collective leadership was part of a complex and not necessarily stable transition process. After insuring the party's primacy, the collective leadership model typically disintegrated into fierce political battles involving shifting political alliances within the ruling establishment. This political intrigue ultimately resulted in the emergence of single dominant leader.

During the Soviet era, the closed nature of the Communist system kept many of the party's inner workings from becoming public knowledge. In Azerbaijan, it is questionable whether similar institutional control mechanisms exist. Thus, potential internal struggles within the New Azerbaijan Party may not stay hidden for long. It is believed that Ilham has several powerful rivals within the ruling establishment.

Considering the instability surrounding the succession process, Azerbaijan's military or security forces potentially could influence political developments in the coming months. The Azerbaijani military played a prominent role in politics in 1990 and 1993. But to a large extent, the military and security services have yet to recover the prestige lost by their disastrous performance during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, it remains debatable whether the military and security services will be actors again in domestic politics.

Two scenarios, however, could lead to the increased politicization of the defense establishment. Former State Department officials familiar with Azerbaijan have theorized that any future leader may need to establish political legitimacy by re-igniting the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Such a venture would require the support of the security sector. The second event, and of greater concern, is that opposition demonstrations in the wake of the presidential election spark violent clashes with security forces. Such violence would increase social separation in Azerbaijan and could erode the government's legitimacy. Either scenario could result in increased security sector influence over the country's leadership.

A savvy politician, such as President Aliyev during his prime, might be expected to negotiate the present transition challenges in Azerbaijan. However, Ilham Aliyev is widely believed to possess far less political acumen than his father. The extent to which the Yeltsin-Putin succession model succeeds in Azerbaijan will depend on how effectively Ilham balances the threats against him.