Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s success in finalizing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan is a major achievement. But Pashinyan’s next challenge may prove even tougher to accomplish – convincing Armenians to embrace an overhaul of the county’s political, economic and social culture through the adoption of a new constitution.

Pashinyan outlined his vision for the country’s transformation, which he frames as “Real Armenia,” in late February.  It stresses the need for entrepreneurship and a new understanding of the meaning of patriotism, focusing on the future and letting go of the past.

From Pashinyan’s standpoint, strategic necessity dictates a need for a new constitution: Armenia’s long-standing partnership with Russia has crumbled, undermining Armenian security. Now, Armenia must adapt to become “more viable in the new geopolitical and regional conditions.”

Old thinking has kept Armenia in “constant conflicts with our neighbors,” he has stated. He believes a new approach that sets aside old grievances can usher in an age of economic prosperity and security. “Peace is the most reliable guarantee of security,” Pashinyan’s Real Armenia doctrine states. “The most important components of ensuring security are the interdependence of the countries of the region, ensuring the country's place in the regional and global supply chain and trade.”

The prime minister is willing to make compromises that many other Armenian politicians are not willing to risk, especially concerning the future of Nagorno Karabakh. 

The first step for the government in implementing the Real Armenia agenda will be amending the preamble of the Armenian constitution, which indicates that Karabakh is a constituent component of historical Armenia. Azerbaijan, which reconquered the territory in late 2023, has made the adoption of an amendment to unequivocally recognize Baku’s sovereignty over the territory a prerequisite for the signing of the peace treaty. 

Given that Armenia and Azerbaijan have finalized the treaty text, it would seem the two governments have agreed on a mutually acceptable resolution concerning Karabakh’s place in the Armenian constitution. But Pashinyan and other government officials have so far not revealed the substance of the compromise. To date, Pashinyan has been cagey, stating that the constitution as presently written does not make any territorial claims against Azerbaijan.

Any move to amend the constitution is sure to fuel a highly emotional debate in Yerevan. For nationalists, relinquishing claims to Karabakh is seen as a betrayal of national interests. Many also contend that conceding on the Karabakh matter would encourage further Azerbaijani claims, particularly concerning the so-called Zangezur corridor, a proposed land connection between the Azerbaijani mainland and the Nakhchivan exclave. Bowing to Baku’s demand for unhindered movement along the corridor would be an unacceptable infringement on Armenian sovereignty in the view of many Armenians. 

Only after Pashinyan can finesse the Karabakh preamble issue and get the peace treaty with Azerbaijan signed, can his government focus on selling the Real Armenia doctrine to a hesitant population.

At that point, geopolitical pressure on Armenia could grow intense. Given that Pashinyan’s government has lost all trust in Russia as a security guarantor, the Real Armenia doctrine calls for the country’s geopolitical reorientation away from Moscow toward the United States and European Union, as reflected in Yerevan’s recent decision to embark on the EU accession process.

This places Armenia in a difficult position because the country’s economy remains dependent on Russia as a trading partner and energy supplier. The Kremlin is not likely to stand by and do nothing as Pashinyan proceeds with his geopolitical pivot. At the same time, it is unlikely Armenia can receive any serious security guarantees or transformative economic support from the US and EU soon. Currently, Western support is more symbolic and rhetorical rather than practical.

Pashinyan has indicated that he wants to put a new constitution that embodies his Real Armenia vision up for approval in a popular referendum before the country’s next scheduled parliamentary election in late 2026. That does not give the government a lot of time to win over the large number of domestic skeptics while at the same time being buffeted by outside forces intent on seeing him fail.

Considering the domestic tensions and external pressures, one of three possible outcomes is likely. The chances for Armenia’s rapid strategic realignment seem low at present, given that Pashinyan appears to lack a critical mass of popular support for the Real Armenia doctrine. Achieving a geopolitical transformation in such a short timespan without triggering a domestic or external crisis is a tall order.

It is also possible that domestic and foreign opposition, from Russia and/or Azerbaijan, may prove too much for the Armenian government to overcome. Russia could apply economic and diplomatic pressure, and Azerbaijan could seek additional territorial or economic concessions from Yerevan to paralyze Armenian governance and, potentially, topple Pashinyan.

Another scenario involves the incremental adaptation of Pashinyan’s vision. If he can get Azerbaijan to sign the peace treaty, Pashinyan can buy himself some time. He may have to push back his timeline for a new constitution, but the fact that domestic forces opposed to the government’s agenda currently lack unity gives Pashinyan what looks to be a decent chance of securing reelection in 2026. He could then work to recalibrate relationships with Russia, Azerbaijan, the United States and EU while building domestic consensus for the Real Armenia program. The process would involve economic diversification, careful engagement with Azerbaijan and deepening ties with the US and EU without triggering regional destabilization.

Armenia now stands at a constitutional crossroads with a peace agreement awaiting signatures. There is no way of telling how Pashinyan’s ambitious initiative to remake Armenian society and secure the country’s sovereignty will turn out. The process over the coming months and years will test the limits of Pashinyan’s political and diplomatic skills and will shape Armenia’s future to better or worse for decades to come.