Kyrgyz society is still shaken by the March riots in the Ak-Sui region, but Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev seems to be on firmer ground than some of his opponents would wish. Opposition leaders have called for Akayev's ouster, and Kyrgyzstan's political observers are predicting that opposition groups will attempt this fall to stoke popular anger in a bid to win political support. But clashes among rival opposition groups may blunt efforts to oust Akayev.
The opposition, lacking unity, is sending Akayev a muddled message. Some opposition members promise to engineer social unrest. On August 21, an opposition newspaper carried this warning from a committee backing Azimbek Beknazarov, the dissident parliament member whose jailing sparked the March protests: "If Akayev does not fulfill the requirements of the 2nd People's Kurultay [or Congress] before 1 September of this year or does not resign voluntary, citizens of the district will proclaim The Great Autumn March to the Capital." But others are following a more cautious strategy. A five-party consortium, the Peoples' Congress of Kyrgyzstan, revealed plans on August 16 to hold peaceful rallies in the Chuy region on September 17. Even as he announced these rallies, Socialist parliamentarian Omurbek Tekebayev downplayed their potential as a lever of change. Kyrgyz news quoted Tekebayev as recognizing that citizens might take Akayev's commitment to "constitutional reform" seriously and skip the rallies. "We cannot force them to stage rallies," he reportedly said.
Akayev, as these remarks suggest, has reached out in limited ways to the moderates in the opposition. On August 10, Akayev met with Tekebayev and fellow oppositionists Melis Eshimkanov, Adakham Madumarov and Emil Aliev. After that meeting, the parliamentarians promised that the country's constitution would soon undergo a reworking and that Akayev would surrender some of his powers to other branches of government. A constitutional commission was due to start work on September 1, meeting participants have said, but it is hard to know how much leverage that commission will enjoy. By August 15, legislators sympathetic to Beknazarov had distanced themselves from the proposed commission. This group includes Madumarov, Ismail Isakov, Erkindik party chief (and two-time political prisoner) Topchubek Turgunaliev, and Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights Chairman Ramazan Dyryldaev, who have proclaimed a new union explicitly designed to force Akayev to resign. These dissidents claimed that 22 social and political movements, including two Communist parties, had joined their cause. They seek a new Elections Code, an overhaul of the Central Electoral Committee, and pre-term Presidential and Parliamentary elections.
To many in the opposition, the constitutional meeting slated for the first half of September represents the last chance for Akayev to peacefully acknowledge dissidents' claims. Opposition parties may claim half the votes at this meeting. Not coincidentally, the more assertive opposition leaders plan their march to Bishkek with residents of Ak-Sui likely to form the spine to coincide with the meeting. The march aims to pressure Akayev into broader reforms, possibly including his resignation or the restructuring of his job into that of a Prime Minister who would be more accountable to lawmakers.
Akayev's deputies have branded the movement behind these more ambitious ideas as an anti-constitutional front. If they maintain that stance, they may invoke the constitution to justify further crackdowns. "Most probably the powers will toughen repressive measures towards opposition parties and movements," said a Kyrgyz political scientist who asked for anonymity. According to him, officials may increasingly tie marches and other protests to the notion that the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) may be trying to infiltrate the country. "The [IMU] troops were staying at the south of the country from autumn 1999 to autumn 2001," notes the political scientist, who argues that common knowledge that the IMU was nearby discouraged residents in the south from openly challenging authority. If groups stage another mass action in the Jalalabad region, he suggests, residents of the region may associate the army's presence with economic stability rather than political repression. Authorities may also refer to IMU threats to justify military action against protests in the south.
Meanwhile, official Bishkek seems prepared to use a charm offensive to win over southern citizens. The upper chamber of Parliament, which operates practically under Akayev's control, has announced plans to meet in Jalalabad on September 22 and 23. While gestures like this will probably not erase citizens' frustration with hard social and economic conditions, they may help Akayev stave off his more radical critics.
But Akayev may only defer, rather than squelch, calls for reform by co-opting the opposition. The Kyrgyz economy remains a recipe for unrest. Despite optimistic forecasts from the state Ministry of Agriculture, independent experts are warning that the country's farm revenue could stall in the next year, with significant losses of white beet crop likely. In mining, another relatively developed sector, a July 8 accident at the Kumtor gold mine killed a worker and has blighted the industry's prospects. And Uzbekistan's tough stand on gas supply could drive more residents to protest. Even if the opposition lets Akayev's team emerge unscathed from September, it will be hard for Kyrgyz authorities to rest easy.
Ibragim Alibekov is the pseudonym for an independent political analyst who lives in and studies the Central Asia region.
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