Washington officials proceeded warily as they prepared to greet Hu Jintao, China's Vice President and heir apparent, who came to meet US President George W. Bush during the week of April 29. While Hu was smiling for cameras in Washington, Chinese diplomats were making discernible efforts to build an anti-American coalition in Central Asia.

New statements from President Jiang Zemin's recent visit to Iran and Libya indicate that as the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington recede, China may be exploring the idea of coalescing regional misgivings about the United States into a bloc. This bloc - which would only succeed if Iran, Russia and the five Central Asian states saw advantages in it - would extend Chinese influence from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan all the way across Iran to the Persian Gulf states. If it includes sales of arms and technology for weapons of mass destruction from Beijing to Tehran, even a loose coalition could affect American influence and attention throughout Central Asia.

Jiang toured Europe, the Middle East and Africa in late April, while Prime Minister Zhu Ronji visited Egypt. Jiang used his Iran stop to posit Chinese interests on the opposite side of American ones. "China opposes US presence in Central Asia and the Middle East," he said in Tehran. China and Iran resurrected contact in June 2000, when Iranian President Mohammed Khatami visited China.

At the time, observers noted that new relations between ancient Asian powers could change the international political equation. Such change may be underway. Khatami has stressed his willingness to explore weapons development - though he swears he will respect existing agreements on non-proliferation - and China, which was one of the main suppliers of arms to Iran in the 1980s during the war with Iraq, would like to step up military cooperation.

The two sides did not disclose any weapons sales or military technology transfer agreements, which might have been signed during the visit, but they did sign six agreements encompassing trade, energy, transportation, culture, education and information technology. The timing of these agreements, in the context of Jiang's blunt remarks, could give American military planners pause.

Khatami has also vocally opposed the American military presence in Central Asia, and recently completed a tour of former Soviet republics. Iran armed with nuclear missiles and other weapons of mass destruction could alter the pace and raise the stakes of Central Asian countries' negotiations with the United States over military bases. They could also threaten American military security in the oil-rich Persian Gulf and, conceivably, affect the security of American citizens. Iran is building two Russian-supplied nuclear reactors at Bushehr, capable of producing uranium and plutonium, which can be enriched into weapons, grade fissile material.

China is not talking about a new arms race with the United States, of course: Iranian analysts pointed out that economic ties between China and the United States dwarf the trade between Beijing and Tehran. But the country does seem interested in stoking misgivings about American influence, without necessarily offering a constructive alternative. Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khameni reportedly told Jiang that "standing up to the US' wrong policies is necessary for the future of the globe." The religious leader reportedly worried that "the US seeks to impose its will regarding global issues on all countries and this is a big danger for the international community." China's ambassador in Tehran, Sun Bi Gan, picked up this theme when he told Iranian television on April 20 that "China supports a multi-polar world."

That phrase sounds like coded anti-Americanism to some ears. Yevgeny Primakov, who served as Russia's Foreign Minister in the mid-90s, popularized the concept of the multi-polar world. In his vision, Russia would inject itself into regional military conflicts and American power would contend against a four-flanked resistance from China, India, Iran and Russia.

In autumn 2001, the phrase seemed to have lost currency, as Russia sided with the United States in the war on terrorism. But Iran never joined the American coalition; even as it renounced the Taliban, it faced accusations from some quarters of helping al Qaeda fighters escape to Saudi Arabia. In January, Bush declared Iran, Iraq and North Korea an "axis of evil" (the countries are not military or strategic allies). China has been interested all along in counter-balancing American influence in Eurasia and the Middle East.

Building an ideological coalition is no simple matter, of course. On the Arab-Israeli conflict, which Tehran was attempting to play up as common ground for joint action, China and Iran engaged in markedly different rhetoric. Iran does not recognize the legitimacy of Israel, and refers to it as a "Zionist entity." Tehran supplies arms to a Shiite organization called Hezbollah (Party of God), which has participated in Palestinian violence. Israel has accused Iran of financing two Palestinian terrorist groups, Islamic Jihad and Hamas.

China, on the other hand, has diplomatic relations with Israel; and President Jiang visited Israel in 2000, spending four days negotiating and vacationing there. During his visit to Iran he said publicly that while China opposes "occupation" and "domination" of the Palestinian lands and support "fair" Arab demands, the sides need to find a solution via peaceful negotiations based on United Nations resolutions. The only concession Jiang made to his hosts was denouncing the US support of Israel.

That selective agreement may indicate China's game plan. Jiang and his deputies may be presenting China to Muslim countries as a sympathetic alternative to the United States, which has supported Israel, but geopolitical repercussions of his recent tour run broader than the Middle East. Jiang's transcripts and speeches reveal a general hostility to US expansionism.

As the rhetoric of post September 11 solidarity recedes, China and Iran may be planning an alliance of convenience to challenge America. Central Asian states could add weight to this alliance, or give it life by flirting with it before the Americans' eyes. However, the Beijing strategists may be up for a rude awakening: as many analysts have suggested, the stability of the theocracy in Tehran may be overrated - and China will be left holding the proverbial strategic bag.