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Georgia, Caucasus, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Russia

Georgia: Can parliamentary vote alter relations with separatist territories?

Russia says it is ready to play facilitating role.

Brawley Benson Oct 10, 2024
A barbed-wire fence separating Georgian territory controlled by Tbilisi and Russian-guarded, breakaway South Ossetia. Georgian Dream officials have vaguely suggested that, if they secure a parliamentary super-majority, they may try to revise Georgia’s official policies on the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Photo: gov.ge) A barbed-wire fence separating Georgian territory controlled by Tbilisi and Russian-guarded, breakaway South Ossetia. Georgian Dream officials have vaguely suggested that, if they secure a parliamentary super-majority, they may try to revise Georgia’s official policies on the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Photo: gov.ge)

Overshadowed by events in Georgia connected with the government’s geopolitical turn away from the West, the separatist entity of Abkhazia has been buffeted by rising tension between local residents and their Russian sponsors in recent months.

An ironic dynamic has thus gained traction. While Georgia’s year of discontent has witnessed the adoption of policies welcomed by Russia, simultaneous developments in Abkhazia have exposed cracks in an erstwhile bastion of support for Moscow, which for the past three decades has been viewed as the territory’s protector.

The most recent catalyst for the breakdown in Abkhaz-Russian relations was a legislative initiative in the breakaway territory that would have enabled foreigners – namely Russians – to purchase real estate, something many Abkhaz considered a threat to their autonomy and national identity.

Mass protests succeeded in forcing the de facto Abkhaz legislature in late July to abandon its effort to adopt what became known as the “apartment law.” Russia did not take the news well: at an early September news conference, Abkhazia’s de facto foreign minister, Sergei Shamba, announced that Russia had cut its subsidies to the territory as of September 1, a move that severely impacted local authorities’ ability to pay salaries for essential workers, including medical personnel, teachers and police.

“It is absolutely clear that a lot of discontent has accumulated,” Shambasaid in comments to reporters, referring to local attitudes towards Russia. “The relationships have changed significantly. It’s not what it used to be.”

He went on to appeal to Abkhaz citizens to “work together” to repair relations “with our strategic ally.”

While Russia’s displeasure with developments in Abkhazia may well have played a role in the decision to stop subsidies, the move could also be a reflection of strained Kremlin finances created by the Russia-Ukraine war; Russian officials may have been looking to achieve budgetary savings wherever they can be found.

Amid the Abkhaz-Russian bickering, an opening has appeared that could potentially lead to an improvement in relations between Georgia and the separatist territory. In a campaign speech on September 14, the founder and honorary chairman of the incumbent Georgian Dream party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, caused an uproar with a suggestion that Georgia should apologize for attacking South Ossetia, thus prompting the war with Russia. In the same speech, he pinned blame for that conflict on the ruling party at the time – and Georgian Dream’s eternal nemesis – the United National Movement.

Responding to Ivanishvili’s apparent reversal of the government’s long-held position that Russia started the war, the Abkhaz Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed openness to “reconciliation” in a statement on September 16.

Experts are skeptical, however, that Ivanishvili’s conciliatory words can lead to actions that improve relations. Any movement in that direction likely would require Georgian Dream to not only win the October 26 parliamentary elections but also gain a super-majority of MPs. Polling data commissioned by an opposition-leaning news outlet indicates that such an outcome is unlikely, provided the vote is free and fair; on the other side, polls commissioned by Georgian Dream unsurprisingly put the party far ahead of other challengers.

Even if Georgian Dream accomplishes a decisive electoral victory, other complications could arise. For example, the so-called “foreign agents” law, which imposes onerous reporting requirements on non-governmental organizations, could have a ripple effect on the implementation of NGO projects in the breakaway region, leading to more reliance on Moscow.

“I think that in a long-term perspective this ‘foreign agents’ law is absolutely dangerous for Abkhazia,” David Jishkariani, a historian who researches the breakaway region, told Eurasianet, adding that he expects Abkhazia will become more isolated as the law is implemented. Abkhazia’s de facto government has attempted to tighten controls of its own NGO sector in recent years, including by proposing a “foreign agents” law similar to Georgia’s.

Georgian Dream officials have vaguely suggested that, if they secure a parliamentary super-majority, they may try to revise Georgia’s official policies on the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “In the case of restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia in a peaceful way, it will be necessary to amend the Constitution of Georgia so that the system of governance and the territorial state arrangement of Georgia will be in line with the new reality,” read a statement from the party from late August.

With a government in Tbilisi that continues to drive Western influence out of the country, Moscow is playing the situation cautiously, emphasizing the need for regional stability. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov seemed to offer a response to Georgian Dream’s statement on September 28 when hesaid Russia was ready to help Georgia “normalize” its ties with its breakaway regions. Tbilisi Mayor and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze said that Georgian Dream took Lavrov’s offer “positively.”

According to Vano Abramashvili, director of the Peace Program at Caucasian House, a Tbilisi-based NGO, Georgian Dream’s statements about the breakaway regions merely serve to energize voters and should be taken with a grain of salt. “Politically, this is the first time Georgian Dream has given attention to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” Abramashvili said, adding that Georgian Dream is using these topics in a “manipulative way.” “There are no clues at all to think rationally that Russia is ready to give us back those territories, for example, and end the occupation.”

Lavrov’s proposal, in any case, is likely a non-starter. In order to “normalize relations,” Georgia would have to make concessions – such as formally acknowledging responsibility for the 2008 war. Such actions would be unappealing to a considerable majority of citizens.

Over the near term, Abramashvili said that Abkhazians may be unhappy with Russia, but they have no other ally to turn to. “These people [Abkhazians] have to survive, they have to live, right?”

Brawley Benson is a Tbilisi-based reporter and recent graduate of the Columbia Journalism School who writes about Russia and the countries around it. Follow him on X at @BrawleyEric.

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