On April 17, as Kyrgyz dissidents began a kurultay or conference, the nation's human-rights advocates are complaining of fresh abuses. Almaz Dyryldaev, coordinator of the Vienna-based Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights in exile, reported on April 16 that authorities have served longtime dissident Topchubek Turgunaliev with a court summons and that "two cars" are constantly following Ramazan Dyryldaev, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights. Amid these charges, and after protest riots in March that ended in five deaths, the Kyrgyz parliament has still not acted on a year-old initiative to create a human rights ombudsman who would attend to such matters.
This bill's stillbirth may further puzzle foreigners, who once termed Kyrgyzstan an "island of democracy" in Central Asia; it may also deepen suspicions that president Askar Akayev is shelving the moderate techniques he once used to govern in favor of a more autocratic approach. In January, the Kyrgyz Parliamentary Assembly's Zhogorku Kenesh (supreme council) reviewed a bill authorizing a Human Rights Ombudsman for several days, but could not muster a quorum to pass it. While it may be tempting to view this failure as proof that Akayev has shifted into a purely repressive mode, or that conservative legislators who oppose democratic fundamentals now dominate Parliament, these conclusions gloss over important dynamics. By tracing the bill's history in Parliament, we can construct a sounder autopsy for it.
The idea of creating a Human Rights Ombudsman predates recent unrest. It arose after the presidential elections of 1995, when police arrested an opposition candidate on disputed claims that he had handed out libelous leaflets. The government imposed (suspended) sentences on two journalists, Res Publica newspaper editor Zamira Sadykova, and freelance reporter Yrysbek Omurzakov (now Editor-in-Chief of Tribune), in 1995 and 1996. Turgunaliev, leader of the Erkindik (Freedom) party, received a one-year suspended sentence for defamation and was arrested twice in 1996. Opposition Ata-Meken (Homeland) party leader Omurbek Tekebayev presented a draft bill on the Ombudsman to the Legislative Assembly for the first time in August 1999. But Akayev and his circle saw the bill as inopportune then. An Ombudsman, and corresponding local structures, could have helped opposition forces rally for the 2000 presidential elections. Only after Akayev gained a third presidential term, in an election that the US State Department described as below international standards for fairness, did he give a green light to the office.
This suggests that the bill's value to Akayev was largely symbolic. If Akayev were acting as a classic Stalinist authoritarian, he would liquidate all manifestations of dissent, even the most harmless. By voicing support for the Ombudsman position, the president seemed to reject Stalinism even as his government was carrying out a crackdown. Immediately after the 2000 elections, police arrested former Vice President Feliks Kulov, charging him with fraud and abuse of office during his term as national security minister two years before. The arrest came amidst protests over alleged ballot rigging when Mr. Kulov lost in his bid for a parliamentary seat. It coincided with crackdowns on independent media. As Kyrgyzstan sought to restructure its debt to the International Monetary Fund, some suspect Akayev wanted to send a signal that he favored openness and freedoms. The bill served this purpose.
As proposed in March 2001, it did little else. The draft would have limited the Ombudsman's ability to negotiate between citizens and state agencies, basically making the Ombudsman an advisor who can report on abuses and seek disciplinary, administrative or criminal liability action. The article does not say anything about the punishment of state authorities in case of failure to enforce the recommendations of the Ombudsman - but does require the Ombudsman to report directly to the President, who would appoint him or her.
As Turgunaliev tangles with Kyrgyz authorities again, the idea of a reportorial Ombudsman seems too weak to counter Kyrgyzstan's increasingly hard-line reputation. If the Ombudsman gained either punitive power or the support of an international court, the position might restore Akayev's progressive credentials. As long as the Ombudsman serves as a presidential functionary, though, he or she would reinforce the president's tendencies. Taking all this into account, many legislators, loyal and otherwise, are indifferent to the bill and do not bother attending sessions to discuss it.
Sadji is the pen name of a freelance journalist in Bishkek.
Sign up for Eurasianet's free weekly newsletter. Support Eurasianet: Help keep our journalism open to all, and influenced by none.