Much that surrounds the movements of Juma Namangani and his band of radical Islamic fighters remains shrouded in mystery. The forces of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have reportedly returned to their bases in Afghanistan, after making a foray into Tajikistan. But it remains unclear how Namangani's fighters manage to cross international borders with relative ease. It may be that Namangani is being used as a pawn in a shadowy geopolitical game involving Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and perhaps other countries in the region.
The location of Namangani remains a matter of dispute. Sources closely connected to former field commanders of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) say militants were flown by helicopters from Tavildara, presumably to Afghanistan. But no source has been able to confirm that Namangani himself was among those airlifted back to Afghanistan. It is also unclear whether all the IMU fighters in Tajikistan, or only a portion, were included in the airlift.
According to local sources, Namangani's decision to move his forces from Afghanistan into Tajikistan was related in part to the ongoing instability in northern Afghanistan, where the Taliban is battling forces led by Ahmad Shah Masood's Northern Alliance for territorial control. Given the fighting and the drought conditions in the region, IMU fighters apparently wanted to seek out a more stable living and training environment. The sources say anywhere from several hundred to several thousand IMU militants crossed the border into Tajikistan. [For more information on Namangani's incursion into Tajikistan see the Eurasia Insight archives].
In Tajikistan, both government and opposition figures are tight-lipped when it comes to discussing Namangani and his maneuvers. In particular, no one seems willing to comment on how the IMU crossed the border. However, local experts say the IMU could not have infiltrated Tajikistan unnoticed. That invites the questions: Who provided logistical assistance to the IMU, and what was the motivation?
An obvious suspect would be Namangani's former companions-in-arms from the UTO. But local observers say UTO leaders do not possess sufficient influence to arrange safe passage across the Afghan-Tajik for the IMU. It is also significant that it was the UTO leader, Islamic Revival Party leader Abdullo Nuri, who was first to disclose that IMU fighters has returned in force to Tajikistan. In a January 2 interview with Radio Liberty, Nuri expressed concern over the presence of such a large number of IMU militants, saying it posed a threat to the tenuous peace in Tajikistan.
At the same time, Nuri stressed that former UTO leaders were not responsible for facilitating the IMU migration. He said that "those who are responsible for the protection of the border, and security forces, are to blame for this."
Under the scenario outlined by Nuri, it is unclear whether Tajik or Russian border guards helped the IMU move into Tajikistan. Local observers say both Tajik and Russian border guards have a motive to help the IMU. In the case of the Tajik government, granting the IMU free passage could be a way to exert pressure on Uzbekistan to extradite the Tajik renegade military commander Colonel Mahmud Khudoberdyyev. Meanwhile, Russia might have sanctioned Namangani's move into Tajikistan as part of its complicated geopolitical game in the region, hoping to compel Uzbekistan to stop its exploratory dialogue with the Taliban, and fall back into line with Moscow's stance on Afghanistan. In addition, the possibility of outright bribery cannot be excluded. According to media reports, Namangani has ample funds to buy safe passage.
Tajik government officials have been reluctant to confirm the presence of IMU militants on Tajik territory. Two government commissions formed especially to address this issue have reportedly found no evidence of an IMU presence in the Tavildara.
Recent developments involving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan may provide an explanation for Namangani's movements. Bilateral relations have been frosty of late, due mainly to differences connected to IMU activities [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. On January 31, Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov and his Uzbek counterpart, Islam Karimov held telephone talks that government press aides and local media said focused on economic and trade issues. But local experts say that, given developments, the two presidents doubtless also discussed the IMU. Whatever the substance of the talks, relations seem to have improved since the telephone conversation. Namangani's forces, of course, have reportedly moved back into Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Tajik officials report that delivery of Uzbek gas has improved, helping to ease an energy crunch in Tajikistan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives].
Experts suggest that Namangani's incursion may have prompted Uzbekistan to reevaluate its policies concerning Tajikistan, leaving Tashkent more receptive to the idea of compromise with Dushanbe. It is also interesting to note that the Tajik parliament has started debate on a Tajik-Uzbek extradition agreement signed last summer during Islam Karimov's visit to Dushanbe. Ultimately, there may be a quid pro quo between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: In exchange for Namangani's departure, Dushanbe may receive Khudoberdyyev.
Nizomi Zamon is an independent researcher who writes on political affairs in Tajikistan.
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