
It's not often that do-overs occur in history. But Kyrgyzstan appears to the beneficiary of just such an opportunity, giving the country another shot at breaking free of authoritarianism's strong gravitational pull in Central Asia. Though lucky, the country still faces immense challenges as the provisional government tries to avoid the pitfalls that derailed the Tulip Revolution of 2005.
The provisional government, which assumed power after violent clashes April 6-7 brought about the collapse of Kurmanbek Bakiyev's administration, remains weak. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. But two developments April 9 may help it consolidate its authority. First, the return of a police presence, working in tandem with volunteer security groups, is fostering the restoration of order in Bishkek following two nights of looting and sporadic gunfire.
In addition, support for Bakiyev, who is refusing to resign after retreating to his home region in southern Kyrgyzstan, continues to slide. A pro-Bakiyev rally in the southern city of Jalal-abad fizzled on April 9, as a large portion of the assembled crowd reportedly began assailing the nominal president's handling of the economy and condemned governmental corruption.
Bakiyev's lingering presence in Kyrgyzstan has the potential to fan sectional conflict in the country, pitting southerners against northerners. The provisional government wants Bakiyev to formally submit his resignation, a development that would naturally enhance the new leaders' legitimacy. So far, though, Bakiyev seems intent on acting as a spoiler. To up the pressure on Bakiyev, the provisional government has issued arrest warrants for several of his close relatives, including his son Maksim, who was reportedly in the United States when the April 6-7 unrest occurred.
"A lot depends on how Bakiyev behaves, and on how the people behave in this situation. Now, there is a 50-50 chance for either confrontation or consolidation of the south and north," Bishkek-based political scientist Nur Omarov said in an interview with EurasiaNet.org on April 9. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Consolidating authority is just the first hurdle for the provisional government. Democratization 2.0 in Kyrgyzstan stands to be a long and complicated process. Already burned twice, the greatest challenge for the provisional government will be fostering public trust in a democratically oriented political system.
In the early years of Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet existence, the country enjoyed a reputation as an "island of democracy" in Central Asia. But Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan's first president, and then Bakiyev both gave in to the temptations of power, building corrupt regimes that were unresponsive to popular needs. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The chief steward of Kyrgyzstan's transitional period this time around is Roza Otunbayeva, the former foreign minister who heads the provisional government. A worldly politician who speaks fluent English and Russia, Otunbayeva has the kind of credentials that fosters confidence in her commitment to democratization. According to some Bishkek political observers, she has a much better idea of what needs to be done than did Bakiyev when he rose to power in 2005 following Akayev's ouster in the Tulip Revolution.
Compared to Bakiyev, "Roza Otunbayeva has considerably better democratic credentials," said Paul Quinn-Judge, Central Asia Project Director for the International Crisis Group. "Her instincts are very good. She has real concerns about how to create a democratic system. However, she is only one person, we don't know what pressures she will face," he added.
Kyrgyzstan has an unfortunate track record, in which power seems to have the singular ability to corrupt the most enlightened of politicians. Akayev, for example, was a cultured academic, with a Ph.D. in physics. But he ended up being driven from office in disgrace, amid allegations of corruption and abuse of power.
Speaking at a news conference on April 8, Otunbayeva said she wants to overhaul the constitution and build consensus for far-reaching economic and political reforms. Under current plans, the provisional government will serve for six months, when new elections will be held and a new constitution ratified.
In commenting about planned constitutional changes, Otunbayeva indicated that the framers would significantly curb executive authority and boost the powers of the legislative branch. "In the next half year, we plan to enact constitutional reform, change the laws and acts about political parties and the Code on Elections," she said. The new constitution is expected to be put to a national referendum.
Bakiyev's administration also made lots of democratization pledges at the outset. But over the course of his five-year tenure, Bakiyev consolidated power in the executive branch, muzzled the press and established control over the most lucrative sectors of the economy.
While Otunbayeva is now saying all the right things, in the minds of many political observers, actions will speak much louder than words. And even if Kyrgyzstan's new leaders are able to avoid the pitfall that sank the previous two presidential administrations -putting personal concerns ahead of the public interest - formidable political and economic challenges await them.
"I would like to hope that this new government will not repeat the mistakes of the former government, and this time it really will be a second chance," Omarov said. "The main mistake of the old government was issues about the division of power and power struggles, and they forgot about the people."
"The provisional government will have to solve various problems that have piled up in the country," Omarov continued. "There will be a lot of new challenges. New oppositional forces will appear for sure. It is hard to predict whether they will be Bakiyev's people, or other opposition parties."
The initial actions of some members of the provisional government have not helped foster a belief that a break with past practices can be made. Representatives of the three main political parties forming the backbone of the provisional government - the Social Democrats, Ak Shumkar, and Ata-Meken - have been engaging in unseemly squabbling over key state posts in the evident hope of better positioning themselves for the looming elections. In addition, Omurbek Tekebayev, a prominent figure in the provisional government, drew criticism for trying to appoint his brother to a top political post.
The framing of the new constitution will be a key in determining the fate of this latest democratization attempt in Kyrgyzstan. Not only do checks and balances have to exist on paper, but effective mechanisms to fairly enforce constitutional provisions need to be put into place. Diluting the power of the presidency alone will not be enough to prevent another slide toward authoritarianism, Omarov said.
"Seeing as we've never had it, a parliamentary system seems very attractive for Kyrgyzstan, but there are shortcomings here too namely the danger of a parliamentary crisis like we saw in Ukraine, where political parties were unable to reach consensus and parliament had to have two elections in one year," Omarov said.
Zamir Osorov, an investigative journalist with the MSN newspaper in Bishkek, said that in addition to constitutional reform, local government needed to become more responsive to the local population.
"People should be able to elect their own governors [in the provinces]," Osorov said. "We need a person who doesn't have any links to anyone, who understands the mechanisms of democracy. We need new people."
Deirdre Tynan is a Bishkek-based reporter specializing in Central Asian affairs. David Trilling contributed reporting.
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