Kyrgyzstan: Revolution Anniversary Prompts Hopes, Doubts about Democratization
Central Asia's most democratic state may also be its most fragile.
Street protests and calls for reform ousted President Askar Akayev and carried Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power on March 24, 2005. But two years later, the political infighting continues, with more opposition protests set to begin April 9. The similarities with changes of government in Georgia and Ukraine proved superficial long ago, leaving behind a host of questions about the nature of Kyrgyz democracy, if indeed it can be called that.
Assuming the demonstrations that ousted Akayev were a true expression of popular will, the outcome is hardly inspiring. Bakiyev's government has done little to meet its promises of reform, whether combating corruption, promoting a freer press, or rebalancing the division of governmental powers.
Meanwhile, the economy is stagnant, limping along at 2.7 percent growth in 2006, far below the government's projection of an 8 percent rise. The biggest economic story over the past year concerned the debate over Kyrgyzstan's plans to ease its debt burden by joining the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). Ultimately, the Bakiyev administration backed away from joining HIPC, amid strong public opposition. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Security has also declined: the looting that accompanied Akayev's departure was followed by a year in which three members of parliament were killed. Several prominent businessmen, most with alleged criminal connections, have also been gunned down, and lawmakers recently approved legislation granting themselves the right to bear weapons in self-defense. Akayev was at least able to keep a lid on organized crime, but under Bakiyev it seems to be open season. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the street protests that brought down Akayev have been revived on a regular basis. Kyrgyzstan's supposedly spontaneous demonstrations always included some element of planning, but now political leaders have it down to a science: erecting tents, carting in supporters, and supplying them with food, water, and, some say, cash and vodka when needed.
The political opposition led the latest round of demonstrations in November 2006, securing a new, compromise constitution that reduced presidential authority. But Bakiyev counterattacked at the very end of the year, slipping in adjustments that shifted power back in his direction. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In the process, Feliks Kulov, Bakiyev's influential yet independent ally in the 2005 elections, lost the premier's seat. The president replaced him with a staunch supporter, Azim Isabekov, eliminating a potential enemy within, but creating one without. Kulov's move into the opposition has galvanized the flagging anti-government forces, greatly increasing the odds that this spring will bring further political unrest. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The prolonged wrangling and the apparent indifference of the public begs the question of whether either side can claim a popular mandate. Bakiyev has indeed failed to deliver on most of his reform promises, and the opposition is right to feel cheated at seeing its revolutionary hopes dashed. But protests can only go so far in prompting change; as their frequency increases, the benefits of calling the authorities to account start to pale in comparison to the drawbacks in terms of stability.
There are ways out of the coming crisis without taking to the streets. In a position paper published last year, local analyst Sheradil Baktygulov argued that Kyrgyzstan must do a better job of incorporating the opposition into government deliberations. A draft law on the subject is a start, he says, but it must be adjusted to include more concrete mechanisms for taking the opinions of the opposition into account. Otherwise, any routine disagreement will quickly rise to the level of a crisis, as it so often does now. Bakiyev's recent conciliatory stance in meetings with opposition leaders is a positive sign, but only if it marks the beginning of an ongoing consultative process.
Baktygulov also calls for greater attention to the development of political parties. Kyrgyzstan may have taken the first step in this direction as well: under the new constitution, half of the members of parliament will be elected by party affiliation, and the winning party will have a chance to name the prime minister. This may help develop a more stable system of party politics in Kyrgyzstan by encouraging regional interest groups to unite under a national platform.
In a more ominous sign, the constitution itself has once more become a bone of contention. Despite the fact that the country has had three different constitutions within the past year, the opposition is calling for fresh constitutional changes. As beneficial as the opposition's proposals may be, the precedent is damaging; an endless cycle of cynical constitutional reform looms, in which political actors manipulate state institutions for short-term advantage. Central Asia has seen far too much of that already.
Despite what some observers may think, though, Kyrgyzstan is no basket case. The struggle for power here is more transparent and competitive than anywhere else in the region. There exists a solid foundation of civil liberties including the freedom of assembly and expression that Kyrgyz citizens have come to take for granted. But the line between taking liberties for granted and just plain taking liberties is blurred in Kyrgyzstan. Putting up a wall between the two should be the next task for the country's democracy-builders.
Daniel Sershen is a freelance journalist based in Bishkek.
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