This essay is part of a series by American diplomats sharing their impressions of the dramatic early years of Central Asia’s independence from the Soviet Union. These memoirs were written at the invitation of the DavisCenter for Russian and Eurasian Studies at HarvardUniversity. We publish these with special thanks to Nargis Kassenova, director of Davis’s Program on Central Asia.

“A plane just flew into the WorldTrade Center.” My wife Mary greeted me with the chilling news as I returned to the Ambassador’s residence in Almaty, Kazakhstan, at the end of one of my first workdays at the U.S. embassy. 

When the second airliner impacted the SouthTower, it became clear that this was not a horrific accident but a terrorist attack on the United States. My diplomatic assignment changed in an instant. Most Americans would have been hard-pressed to locate Kazakhstan on a map, and since the U.S. diplomatic withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 1990s, the United States had relegated Central Asia to a peripheral diplomatic priority. But as the Bush Administration developed its war plan to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Central Asia overnight became vital strategic real estate.

Mary and I were still grappling with jet lag from the 24-hour trip from Washington to Almaty when 9/11 overtook us just days into our assignment in Kazakhstan. In the overnight hours of September 5-6 we arrived in Almaty, the commercial and cultural capital, but not the political capital and seat of government. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev had moved the capital to Astana, 800 miles to the north on the Kazakh steppe, forcing government ministries and offices to relocate and leaving behind foreign embassies in Almaty. With the embassy’s buildings, secure communications, and personnel located a two-hour flight away from the capital, this was a major impediment to doing business with the president and Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) as the events of a frenetic autumn accelerated. 

A former factory worker who rose to become first secretary of the communist party of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev had been president of Kazakhstan since its independence. When Secretary of State James Baker visited Kazakhstan in September 1991 as the Soviet Union was unraveling, I joined his party in Almaty as Baker met with Nazarbayev. Among both Americans and Kazakhstanis there was widespread pessimism that an independent Kazakhstan could emerge, let alone survive. But Nazarbayev conveyed supreme confidence in his, and Kazakhstan’s, ability to make independence work. Nazarbayev’s confidence was rooted in his embrace of a heroic Kazakh history and his own impressive self-confidence. 

Dealing with Nazarbayev after 9/11: Back-slapping and wire-brushing

The 9/11 attacks transformed the U.S-Kazakhstan relationship. It soon became clear that the American offensive against the Taliban would not be limited to an air campaign as had been the case during the war against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999. But if the Bush Administration intended to mount a combined air/ground campaign to invade Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban, it needed ground access to Afghanistan. Pakistan and Central Asia were the only feasible options. But to offer their territory and airspace to American operations in Afghanistan, Central Asian leaders would need at least a tacit nod from Russia. Vladimir Putin, in office as Russian president for some 18 months, had his own reasons for welcoming the demise of Taliban rule in Kabul. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had exported narcotics, Islamic extremism, and political instability that threatened Moscow, as well as the Central Asian states. In retrospect, the months immediately following 9/11 were a high point in U.S.-Russia cooperation symbolized by Putin’s visit to the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas, in November 2001. 

In our conversations after 9/11, Nazarbayev credibly projected empathy with the American people, sincerity in his rejection of terrorism from any quarter, and readiness to work with the United States where we could find common ground. Nazarbayev could elicit back-slapping laughter at his jokes from American presidents and cabinet secretaries, but he also needled the same Americans with dexterity when it suited his purposes. With a succession of American ambassadors, including me, Nazarbayev could be affable, funny, and cooperative, but, if the conversation turned to Kazakhstan’s democracy deficit or human rights violations, he could administer a wire-brushing that left even the most experienced diplomat exhausted. Nazarbayev was the most formidable counterpart that I engaged in a diplomatic career, including encounters with the Soviets, Cubans, apartheid-era South Africans, Serbians, and Romania’s megalomaniac dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

Our immediate priority was to do our best to secure the American embassy in Almaty. The chancery was located downtown, surrounded by city streets and high-rise buildings, with no setback that could mitigate a terrorist attack on foot or by truck bomb. My staff, led by DCM Dan Russell, and later Mark Asquino, did everything humanly possible to harden our perimeter and raise our alert status to war footing. Nazarbayev suspended diplomatic protocol by visiting the chancery to sign our condolence book. Prior to his visit, ordinary Kazakhstanis inundated the street in front of the embassy with flowers in sympathy with the Americans lost on 9/11. During his brief visit, Nazarbayev was gracious, expressing full solidarity with the United States in the fight against terrorism. He and I agreed that we would need to work closely to turn mutual empathy into concrete cooperation. As a first step, he agreed to receive my credentials quickly so that I could get to work officially. It was a good start. 

I worked with Nazarbayev and his foreign minister, Erlan Idrissov, to secure overflight rights for U.S. and coalition aircraft essential to success of the invasion of Afghanistan. Idrissov was a Soviet-educated diplomatic technician, who spoke English and saw his job as implementing Nazarbayev’s instructions in dealing with foreign leaders and ambassadors. However, Idrissov was not among the close circle of family and old comrades who had been with Nazarbayev during his rise to power.

The issue of overflight rights proved a tough nut to crack, in part because the number of these around the clock flights increased exponentially as the ramp up to military operations in Afghanistan accelerated. I worked directly with Idrissov to obtain clearances, but the process did not move fast enough in part because I was in Almaty and he in Astana. I convinced Idrissov that the only solution was a blanket overflight authorization together with my commitment to keep him informed of the flights. We tried a dedicated phone line from the embassy to the Foreign Ministry (MFA), but the link was plagued by constant technical glitches and my calls often went unanswered on the MFA side. We resorted to cell phone calls about migrating steppe eagles, hardly likely to convince Russian monitors that the Kazakh foreign minister and American ambassador shared a devotion to ornithology. We eventually worked out a process between the embassy’s defense attache (DATT) office and Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) that allowed flights to regularly transit Kazakhstan’s airspace without mishap.

The American military campaign that toppled the Taliban regime greatly impressed Nazarbayev and helped solidify Kazakhstan’s cooperation. I was delighted to learn that Secretary of State Colin Powell intended to visit in early December bringing an invitation to Nazarbayev to visit Washington for a meeting with President Bush later that month. This was exactly the recognition that Nazarbayev had been seeking and anticipating. In my view, we needed to use these meetings to set a broad-bottomed agenda with Kazakhstan that would extend beyond security and counterterrorism to include non-proliferation, economic, commercial and energy cooperation, and democracy and human rights. Secretary Powell proved to be an indispensable ally in that process. 

Secretary Powell arrived in Kazakhstan on December 9 in the middle of a grueling itinerary that would take him to a series of countries essential to the effort to consolidate the gains of the overthrow of the Taliban. As I went over the schedule with the Secretary in the car on the way to the meeting with Nazarbayev, he asked about the lunch the Kazakh side had proposed, even though the visit took place during Ramadan in a majority Muslim country. As I had expected, Nazarbayev had hardly completed his welcoming remarks when he suggested that the delegations repair to lunch. The doors behind him opened to reveal tables groaning with a feast complete with an impressive array of spirits of all kinds. The luncheon was a rousing success, even after Secretary Powell and Nazarbayev, joined by Idrissov and me, took our leave for an extended private conversation. 

The secretary thanked Nazarbayev for Kazakhstan’s cooperation with the Afghanistan campaign and assured him that President Bush looked forward to their meeting in Washington later that month. Nazarbayev beamed with anticipation and asked the secretary to convey to President Bush his commitment to continued cooperation in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan and combat international terrorism. Nazarbayev assured the secretary that Kazakhstan would continue cooperation with the U.S. on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and development of commercial and energy ties. Tellingly, he made no commitments on democracy and human rights, despite Powell’s efforts to engage him. With the meeting and lunch concluded, some members of the American delegation left feeling a bit wobbly from Kazakh hospitality. 

Nazarbayev began his December visit to the United States with a stop in Houston for meetings with former President George H.W. Bush and with executives of major American energy investors in Kazakhstan, including Exxon/Mobil and Chevron/Texaco. On December 21, 2001, Nazarbayev opened his oval office meeting with President Bush with a bold gambit asserting that the elder Bush had asked him to convey that “41” intended to kick the current President’s backside at the Bush family bowling competition over the holidays. After a brief hesitation, President Bush erupted in laughter, joined by the entire Bush foreign policy team. The President replied that, after the oval office meeting, he and Nazarbayev would together call 41 to let him know that the current incumbent of the oval office intended to do the backside kicking, setting off another round of convivial laughter. 

Nazarbayev deftly pocketed Bush’s appreciation for Kazakhstan’s support for the “war on terror” and renunciation of nuclear weapons to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. Nazarbayev was justly proud of his decision in 1993-94 to return to Russia Soviet-era nuclear warheads orphaned in Kazakhstan by the break-up of the Soviet Union, but it was almost impossible to satisfy his desire for recognition as a champion of nuclear non-proliferation. Nazarbayev asked the President to create a U.S.-Kazakhstan enterprise fund to invest in Kazakh private sector firms, along the lines of the highly successful Polish/American Enterprise Fund (PAEF) established in 1989. Having overseen the operation and wind-down of PAEF in a previous assignment as Coordinator of U.S. assistance programs in Eastern Europe, I was convinced that this was not a good fit for Kazakhstan, a view reinforced by a negative head shake from Secretary Powell. I said that Kazakhstan had implemented market reforms beyond the point where an enterprise fund was needed, but that we would work with Nazarbayev to promote Kazakhstan’s reform agenda and integration into global economic institutions.

Nazarbayev returned to economics and trade later at a lunch hosted by Vice President Dick Cheney at his residence and attended by Secretary of Commerce Don Evans and other senior Bush Administration leaders. Nazarbayev made clear that he was nettled because Kazakhstan remained subject to the Cold-War era Jackson-Vanik Amendment which required a Presidential determination that the GOK was not impeding emigration to receive most-favored-nation (normal) trade relations with the United States. Why should Kazakhstan be subject to legislation originally designed to leverage emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, which no longer existed? Nazarbayev insisted: “I have allowed all Jews to leave Kazakhstan if they wish, and a million Russians to boot!” 

Nazarbayev drew laughter from the American side, but no commitment to graduate Kazakhstan from Jackson-Vanik, in part because many in Congress believed that graduation should be conditioned on overall improvement of Kazakhstan’s democracy and human rights record. Cheney and Evans agreed to continue to work the issue and, after considerable bureaucratic heavy lifting, the Commerce Department in March 2002 designated Kazakhstan a “market economy,” a major milestone toward graduation from Jackson-Vanik and Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The GOK completed accession to the WTO in 2015 but, as of this writing, Congress has not passed legislation to graduate Kazakhstan from Jackson-Vanik and extend Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to Kazakhstan.

Nazarbayev’s visit established a broad-based agenda for U.S.-Kazakhstan relations. The two Presidents issued a joint statement that called for “cooperation on counterterrorism and non-proliferation, democratic political and free-market economic reform and market-based investment and development of energy resources.” But the U.S.-Kazakhstan “strategic partnership” was not self-sustaining. It would take determined diplomacy on both sides as new challenges emerged in virtually every arena of U.S.-Kazakhstan relations. 

The GOK’s understanding of the “war on terror” shifted in 2002 as it became evident that the U.S. had pivoted from Afghanistan to plans for the invasion of Iraq. Nazarbayev had no use for Saddam Hussein, especially since the Iraqi dictator’s refusal to verifiably end his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction contrasted so sharply with Kazakhstan’s transparent renunciation of nuclear weapons in the 1990s. But Nazarbayev and his ministers worried that an invasion of Iraq might divert American attention away from Afghanistan and Central Asia. During a 2002 visit by USCENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks, Nazarbayev needled Franks about the timetable of his war plan for the Iraq invasion. As Nazarbayev repeatedly pressed Franks on the date for the invasion, I watched the red creep up the general’s neck. Finally, Franks slamming the table replied: “Mr. President, you can be sure that we will not invade Iraq today because I am in Kazakhstan.” Nazarbayev laughed and agreed. 

The invasion of Iraq presented Kazakhstan with an opportunity to underscore its commitment to partnership with the United States. Given the history of Central Asian involvement in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, direct engagement on the ground against the Taliban was a bridge too far for Nazarbayev and the other Central Asian Presidents. However, Iraq proved to be different as Kazakhstan deployed a small group of combat engineers to Iraq to assist with demining and explosive ordnance demolition. While Kazakhstan’s contribution to the coalition in Iraq was minimal and short-term, it proved to be a useful way for Kazakhstan to demonstrate its commitment to U.S. and coalition counterterrorism operations. That commitment was more substantially demonstrated by Kazakhstan’s later central role in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) which provided essential logistical support in the transport of non-lethal supplies to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan until Russia shut NDN down in 2015. 

Advancing non-proliferation: Nunn-Lugar, loose nukes and bio pathogens

Since the inception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiative championed by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, Kazakhstan had been one of the most responsible and successful partners of the U.S. in reducing the possibility that unsecured nuclear material, infrastructure and know-how might leak into the hands of terrorists or other malign actors. As the primary test site for Soviet nuclear weapons programs, Kazakhstan had a concrete interest in reducing the proliferation risk and the threat to its own people from residual nuclear material and infrastructure. However, the GOK also wanted to preserve the option of nuclear electric power generation and maintained research reactors that were still powered by weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). During 2001-04, we began a dialogue with the GOK about a swap of the HEU for non-weapons grade low enriched uranium (LEU) that would support Kazakhstan’s peaceful nuclear industry while greatly reducing the proliferation risk. That dialogue eventually bore fruit with agreement during the Obama Administration to down-blend the HEU at Kazakhstan’s nuclear reactors and remove spent HEU from those facilities.

Two decades before the COVID 19 pandemic, the U.S. and Kazakhstan began joint work to reduce the hazard of biological toxins that had been key to Soviet-era biological weapons research and facilities in Kazakhstan. Following independence in 1991, Kazakhstan had never pursued biological weapons and, in August 2007, formally joined the Biological Weapons Convention. However, Kazakhstan maintained one of the world’s largest collections of pathogenic strains, including plague, anthrax and tularemia, to support research and production of vaccines to contain outbreaks of naturally occurring human and animal diseases. These highly dangerous toxins were maintained in research facilities and agricultural extension stations across Kazakhstan lacking even rudimentary safety and security standards. Some of these toxins were stored in ordinary kitchen refrigerators at remote locations.

Washington proposed that Kazakhstan transfer its collection of pathogens to the U.S. in return for appropriate financial compensation, but the GOK was clearly determined to retain the collection. The U.S. strategy then shifted to support for Kazakhstan’s efforts to enhance the safety, security, and research value of the strains. During an August 2003 visit to Kazakhstan, Senator Lugar announced a CTR grant of $40 million to begin this process. In December 2004, the U.S. and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to build a secure, state-of-the-art laboratory for study of plague and other infectious diseases and for development of vaccines. During 2001-04, the U.S. and Kazakhstan launched a cooperative process that eventually resulted in construction of the Central Reference Laboratory (CRL), officially opened in 2020, that has greatly reduced the threat associated with these biotoxins, while enabling Kazakhstan to conduct research in a facility built to modern safety and security standards.

End of Part 1