Moscow Hostage Crisis Encourages Closer Russian-Azerbaijani Relations
Officials are clamping down on Chechen activity in Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the Moscow hostage crisis. Observers say the Azerbaijani action is motivated more by a desire to strengthen ties between Baku and Moscow than by fear of Russian retaliation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated in an October 28 televised address that Moscow would expand its anti-terrorism efforts to include "all places where terrorists and their ideological and financial backers are based." [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Under Putin's criteria, Azerbaijan could qualify as a target of possible Russian action to suppress Chechen rebel activity. However, there is no indication that Russian-Azerbaijani tension is poised to rise. If anything, the hostage incident seems to be spurring a strengthening of bilateral ties.
Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliyev's administration has acted quickly to reassure Russia over Baku's loyalties. Even before Putin's announcement, Azerbaijani authorities ordered the closure of the Chechen cultural center in Baku, which served as a de facto representative office of the separatist leadership under Aslan Maskhadov.
In a separate move, law-enforcement officers on October 29 shut down an independent school attended mainly by the children of Chechen refugees, the Azadliq newspaper reported. The school served those denied access to the state-run school system, primarily because their parents lacked proper refugee documentation, the newspaper added.
Russia's ambassador to Baku, Nikolai Ryabov, hailed the closure of the center which he described as "in effect an intelligence agency" for Maskhadov's separatists.
The moves against Chechen interests fit into a two-year trend of warming Russian-Azerbaijani relations. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. During the same period Baku has taken an increasingly dim view of the Chechen separatist cause. It now appears that Russia may be offering incentives for continuing Azerbaijani support. The Russian-language Azerbaijani daily Zerkalo reported October 29 that Russian officials had ordered the closure of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians representative office in Moscow. Armenians at the representative office, however, denied that they received an order to close, Baku's ANS-TV reported.
Azerbaijan's attitude towards Chechens was not always so frosty. During the first Chechen war (1994-96) Baku broadly supported the rebels, providing shelter for Chechen refugees. And in 1998, Aslan Maskhadov was an honored guest at Aliyev's 75th birthday celebration.
But when Russia considered imposing visa restrictions on Azerbaijanis and Georgians in 2000, Baku began its rapprochement with Moscow. Since then, several suspected Chechen rebels have been prosecuted in Azerbaijan, and others extradited to Russia. This seems to have worked: Azerbaijan, in contrast to Georgia, has avoided Russian visa restrictions.
When Aliyev visited Moscow in September he was reported as saying, "Baku fully backs the counter-terrorist operation conducted by Russia in its own territory." [For background see the EurasiaNet Business and Economics archive]. This in turn was applauded by Putin, who replied that "We are assured that Azerbaijan has sealed its northern borders and, unlike Georgia, will not host guerrilla bases in its territory."
Chechen representatives in Baku now complain that the people who will be hurt most by the most recent developments are civilian refugees. The Turan news agency reported October 28 that the head of the Chechen cultural center, Mayrbek Taramov, said the cause of the closure was "a misunderstanding." He indicated that the center's inability to operate would also increase the suffering among the approximately 8,000 Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan. Some Chechen advocates say there could be thousands more refugees in Azerbaijan who lack documentation.
In an interview with EurasiaNet conducted just hours before the cultural center's closure, Maskhadov's personal representative in Baku, Ali Asayev, was restrained in his analysis of the shifting Azerbaijani position towards Chechens.
"I'd not speak of the situation becoming better or worse," Asayev said. "When Aliyev said to support the counter-terrorist operation [in Chechnya], I do not believe that he supported the genocide of the Chechen people."
Asayev played down the number of Chechens extradited by Azerbaijan to Russia. According to some observers, about 10 Chechen guerrillas and sympathizers have been handed over to Moscow. But Asayev said that there were only four such cases involving Chechens, and "two of them have been released by now."
In an October 27 interview with the Yeni Musavat newspaper, however, Asayev indicated that the closure of the cultural center could not completely eliminate advocacy for the Chechen cause. "One should bear in mind that the representative office is not an officially-registered body and it does not run officially," Asayev said. "How can one close down something that does not exist?"
Daan van der Schriek is a freelance journalist based in Baku.
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