Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev has never handed out trust indiscriminately. By dismissing Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev on January 28 and replacing him with Imangali Tasmagambetov, a conservative and staunch ally, Nazarbayev seems to be playing for time in the face of increasingly open challenges to Kazakhstan's key policies. Some observers say that the appointment of Tasmagambetov reflects the government's weakness as it retrenches to maintain stability and continuity. Other observers see the move as the first indication of impending political reform. In any case, the president appears to be rejecting the dynastic model that had inflamed his opposition. The appointment of Tasmagambetov may herald a shift toward an oligarchic model that would let Nazarbayev step down with some dignity intact.
First and foremost, the move protects Nazarbayev against restive supporters of Rakhat Aliev, his son-in-law, who served in his inner circle until fairly recently. It may also burn a hole in the presumption that the chief would look to his own family for successors and lieutenants. Indeed, it may herald the return to political legitimacy of exiled former prime minister Akhezhan Kazhegeldin "The new prime minister is not a threat to Nazarbayev, and seems to be very close to the old Nazarbayev elites," says an expert loyal to Kazhegeldin. "These people are very reasonable, and are not favorably disposed to dynastic plans." They are also reportedly somewhat loyal to Kazhegeldin- but not fanatically so.
Rumors had circulated for nearly a year that Tokayev would soon step down to return to his previous post as Minister of Foreign Affairs. After several parliamentarians opposed Aliev's appointment to the position of Deputy Chairman of the Kazakhstan National Security Committee, he abruptly stepped down on November 14, 2001. He retained a ceremonial post in the President's personal guard, but the jig was up. With Nazarbayev's daughter to demonize, pro-reform business and political leaders embraced a new party, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. Promoters of this party agitated for direct election of provincial governors and other changes. For Nazarbayev, the writing was on the wall.
On November 21, several senior Kazakhstan government officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Uraz Djandosov and Deputy Defense Minister Zhannat Ertlesova, were fired as a result of their participation in Democratic Choice. Prime Minister Tokayev defended the firings by pointing to the importance of preserving stability. Tokayev offered to resign as Prime Minister, but Nazarbayev, in the midst of preparations for a planned trip to Washington, DC, declined the offer. The president was anxious to find a resolution to the scandals and divisiveness that would not diminish his ability to take credit for Kazakhstan's booming economic growth, rapidly developing energy sector and support for international anti-terrorism. Perhaps he was just concerned about the timing.
Alexander Zaslavsky, who directs research at the Eurasia Group in New York, suspects Nazarbayev decided to cast his lot with the relatively meek democratic opposition rather than with his ambitious sons-in-law. "The democratic opposition has not been much of a threat," Zaslavsky says. "Nazarbayev created this system, Aliev crossed the line, and others banded together. Perhaps they got too big too soon."
Moreover, by seeming to embrace the possibility of a coalition government or a real two-party election, Nazarbayev may have paved a road for another rosy visit to Washington. In December 2001, he and United States President George W. Bush signed a joint statement pledging Kazakhstan to international standards of governance. The statement reaffirmed Nazarbayev's commitment to promoting the rule of law, freedom of religion, human rights and strengthening democratic institutions and processes, such as independent media, local government, pluralism and free and fair elections. Without the military importance of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan needs to affirm international rules in order to attract long-term investment in its oil sector.
The opposition knows this as well as Nazarbayev - and is regrouping during the cabinet shakeup. Early in 2002, Kazhegeldin joined with executive committee Chairman Amirzhan Qosanov, Azamat Party Co-Chairman Petr Svojk and Gulzhan Ergalieva of the People's Congress of Kazakhstan to form a new United Democratic Party. In Almaty on January 14, representatives of the National Congress, Azamat and the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan endorsed the program of the United Democratic Party. This program advocates abolishing the present bicameral parliament in favor of unicameral body and reforming the country's administrative-territorial structure to reduce the number of provinces to seven with popularly elected leaders.
Nazarbayev's dilemma stems in part from the good sense of these proposals. Indeed, he has argued for many of them, particularly the local election of province governors - but always said the country was not yet stable enough for such a step. By appointing the loyalist Tasmagambetov, a former Communist apparatchik and longstanding public official, Nazarbayev can fend off calls for radical reform while projecting a more pluralist agenda to the West. "I think he's buying time to avoid hard choices," says Martha Brill Olcott, who studies Kazakhstan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Tasmagambetov trod familiar territory in his acceptance speech. He stressed the need to develop chemical and mineral industries, improve transportation and communications infrastructure, further develop the financial sector and reform social services. He also called for a stronger Commonwealth of Independent States and closer ties with Russia. All these come directly from Nazarbayev's previously articulated priorities.
Nonetheless, this shakeup could portend more meaningful governance changes in the next 18 months. The new agenda of groups such as Democratic Choice figures to grow increasingly attractive to Kazakhstan's rapidly growing business and financial circles, and whichever party can claim ownership of reform ideals will earn great credibility in the international community. "Now the issue of succession is very important" to Nazarbayev, says an opposition member. "He could come out like Nelson Mandela, or he could come out like Ceaucescu." By maneuvering to install a good soldier, Nazarbayev may be preparing to bow out with his legacy secure.
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