Yet unlike many of his contemporaries in Western Europe, Gvenetadze keeps these thoughts to himself.
As the world is gripped by the conflict in Iraq and tens of thousands of anti-war demonstrators flood the streets of European capitals, life in Tbilisi carries on as usual. Here, two attempts at anti-war demonstrations managed to pull onto the streets no more than 50 to 70 protestors. In parliament, meanwhile, there have been no debates about the rights and wrongs of the attack on Iraq, no ideological clash between hawks and doves.
Consensus is a rare occurrence in Georgia's political establishment, which is full of warring opposition fractions. But when it comes to Iraq the verdict is unanimous: Georgia is wholeheartedly and unconditionally with the United States.
This overwhelming support for the U.S. action against Iraq is hardly a reflection of Georgian politicians' ideologies. The reasons, in fact, are practical. And perhaps nothing explains Georgians' stance better than the comment by President Eduard Shevardnadze, the only leader in the Caucasus who has publicly declared his unconditional support for the U.S. action against Iraq.
"Georgia is a small country and the United States supports Georgia's many efforts in many fields. Georgia will therefore always support the United States," said Shevardnadze in his recent interview with Georgia's State Radio.
In Shevardnadze's own words, Georgia's support for the United States is not simply a choice but "a duty." Indeed, Georgia owes much to the United States--this tiny nation is one of Washington's largest per capita aid recipients, with assistance amounting to $1 billion since 1992.
But the Georgia-U.S. relationship is not only about money.
Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction might be just 400 kilometers away from Georgia, but this concerns Tbilisi much less than the proximity of its northern neighbor, Russia. Ever since independence, Georgia has struggled to move away from Moscow's destabilizing influence, while the Kremlin has tried just as hard to keep a handle on the Caucasus.
Georgia's desire to move away from Russia's influence is the driving force of Tbilisi's main foreign policy goal--membership in NATO. This makes partnership with the United States vital.
But Washington too has its interests.
The U.S.-Georgian partnership gained strategic form when, much to the Kremlin's dissatisfaction, the governments of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia finalized the construction of the U.S.-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The pipeline will bypass Russia, provide an alternative source of oil for United States and Israel and could significantly upset the Kremlin's traditional monopoly on provision of energy to Georgia.
Moscow's unhappiness reached a new pitch after the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington, when the Bush administration sent military advisers to Georgia to train the country's army in counterterrorist operations as part of a broader $62 million program of military assistance to Tbilisi.
Initially, the goal of these U.S.-trained soldiers was to establish order in the Pankisi gorge, where Chechen and allegedly Al Qaeda militants were sheltering. However, now Georgian officials say that the troops will be used mainly to safeguard the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
Whatever their role, the U.S. military presence has been a major irritant for Russia, which has always viewed Georgia as its own backyard. Russo-Georgian tensions climaxed last September when the Kremlin threatened military action against Georgia if Tbilisi did not purge the Pankisi gorge of Chechen rebels. For Tbilisi, the military standoff with Russia also turned into a test of America's loyalty to Tbilisi.
Russian President Vladimir Putin called for war against Georgia at the very time when the Bush administration sought Putin's support for the Iraq campaign. This sparked fears in Tbilisi that Washington would give Moscow a free hand in the Caucasus in exchange for the Kremlin's endorsement of the war in Iraq.
Those fears proved wrong. Washington backed Tbilisi's assertion that Georgians were capable of ridding the gorge of Chechen and Arab militants and made a harsh statement against any possibility of deployment of Russian troops in Pankisi.
Today, it's Washington's turn to look for allies, and this gives Georgia a chance to prove its loyalty to Uncle Sam and reap some gains along the way.
Tbilisi has already gone beyond formal vows of allegiance to the United States. Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze offered Washington the Vaziani military base for use by U.S. armed forces. There was also speculation that the United States would use Georgian bases to supply America's Kurdish allies in northern Iraq.
But Georgia's military infrastructure is much too old and battered for the U.S. army, and despite Turkey's unwillingness to let the United States use its military bases, Washington has not taken up Georgia's offer.
Yet it is clear that Tbilisi would have happily welcomed U.S. troops. Unlike Turkey, overwhelmingly Christian Georgia does not have to fear mass unrest from its Muslim population. And being helpful to Washington in this war would have been an excellent opportunity to prove Georgia's relevance in the world, increase the American military presence in the region, and move further away from Russian influence.
For more on Georgia, go to our Russia country page at georgia.tol.cz. The page includes books about Georgia and music from Georgia, as well as links to ministries, media, and think tanks.
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