If the past is prelude to the future, a 2009 cable from former US Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft, released by WikiLeaks on December 2, reveals some of the reasoning that may have influenced President Mikheil Saakashvili’s surprise November 23 offer to sign a non-use-of-force agreement with Russia.
In a June 18, 2009 dispatch on military cooperation with Georgia, Tefft reportedly wrote Washington that "[i]n the months after" the August 2008 war with Russia, "senior Georgian officials expressed their willingness to pursue a non-use of force agreement if Russia made certain concessions." Noting that the concept had not yet been “explored” with Tbilisi, Tefft supposedly reasoned that "if Georgia were to call Russia's bluff and offer to sign such an agreement with Russia itself … the burden would shift to Russia to demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to stability" in the South Caucasus.
"It is unlikely that Russia, which still maintains the fiction that it is not a party to the [2008] conflict, would accept Georgia's offer, but it would be left on the defensive," the cable continues. "Meanwhile Georgia could pursue its defensive development with a ready answer to any Russian claims of belligerence or provocation."
Whether or not Russia privately has indicated any willingness to make concessions to Georgia following Saakashvili's non-use-of-force offer remains unknown. Publicly, however, the Kremlin has cold-shouldered the proposal, suggesting that Tbilisi ought to sign any such agreement with separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Such an idea is a non-starter as far as Tbilisi is concerned.
Tefft, who enjoyed particularly friendly ties with Saakashvili's administration, argues that any move by the United States to reduce military assistance in a bid to smooth over ties with Moscow would give Russia a green light to meddle in other post-Soviet countries. Georgia's losses from its five-day conflict with Russia included "30 percent of its armored vehicles, 40 percent of US-produced AR-15 rifles, and at least 60 percent of its air defense capability," he wrote. Sixteen armored Humvees for Georgian Special Forces and an unidentified number of Turkish-made armored personnel carriers were the only "lethal military equipment" deliveries made to Georgia in the 10 months since the war, according to the document.
The ambassador encourages Washington to assist Tbilisi with acquiring the capabilities, including "lethal defensive systems," sufficient to stop a ground attack. "Current Georgian operational thinking is that if they can defend Tbilisi from occupation for 72 hours, then international pressure will force the advance to pause," he wrote.
Tefft's entreaties for Washington to support Georgia appear to follow a pattern. In an alleged July 2007 cable, also released by WikiLeaks, the former ambassador detailed a list of possible Moscow-orchestrated covert operations that he argues "suggests that the Russians are aggressively playing a high-stakes, covert game, and they consider few if any holds barred." Aside from disinformation campaigns, the measures, the document alleges, include everything from “missile attacks and murder plots to a host of smaller-scale actions.”
The dispatch, though, primarily relies on information from Georgian officials. The alleged cable cites one "Abkhaz representative" who supposedly told Tefft that Russia had put "strong pressure" on de facto Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in 2006 to "attack the Georgians" for reasserting Tbilisi's control over the Upper Kodori Gorge.
In the former ambassador’s view, Russia’s main goal was to frustrate Georgia’s plans to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “No doubt the Russians would like to see [Georgia President Mikheil] Saakashvili removed, but the variety and extent of the active measures suggests the deeper goal is turning Georgia from its Euro-Atlantic orientation back into the Russian fold.”
The extent to which such warnings were taken into consideration in Washington is open to interpretation. The Guardian, a WikiLeaks partner, has also released details of a supposed June 2007 conversation between President Saakashvili and US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns in which Saakashvili expresses concern that US recognition of Kosovo's independence would result in Russia recognizing Abkhazia.
Burns responds that Moscow's threats to make such a move are "hollow" and that such recognition would isolate Russia internationally. The threat proved less than "hollow," but it looks like Russia can live with any isolation that has been the result.
Giorgi Lomsadze is a journalist based in Tbilisi, and author of Tamada Tales.
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