President Aliyev Struggles To Juggle Azerbaijans Interests In Search of Karabakh Solution
President Heidar Aliyev is pressing for a lasting political settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh that would help cement his legacy as peacemaker, and improve the chances for a smooth political succession in Azerbaijan. But in trying to tie together the loose ends of Azerbaijan's most difficult security dilemma, Aliyev is running a risk of becoming wrapped up in knots.
Aliyev's latest attempt to produce a breakthrough in Karabakh negotiations appears to have hit a snag. The most recent round of Karabakh talks, held March 4-5 in Paris, ended without making tangible progress, and Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart, President Robert Kocharyan, were tight-lipped about the substance of the discussions. Nevertheless, French President Jacques Chirac, who mediated the talks, attempted to put a positive spin on the talks by expressing optimism that a settlement could be achieved before the end of 2001.
For Aliyev, the Karabakh peace process represents a delicate balancing act. The Azerbaijani president has staked out a pragmatic negotiating stance that clashes with prevailing public opinion. Some observers say Aliyev's apparent willingness to compromise is rooted in a desire to bolster the prospects for a smooth leadership succession, in which the elder Aliyev would transfer power to his son, Ilham. But, as one political scientist suggests, any deal that is perceived by Azerbaijanis as giving away too much could backfire for the Azerbaijani leader.
"Society could unite against any peace that is perceived as unjust," said Eldar Namazov, a political scientist in Baku who served as a top presidential aide. "On the question of Karabakh, no one can afford to ignore public opinion."
In the days leading up to the Paris summit, Aliyev sought to prepare public opinion for a compromise solution that would follow the rough outlines of a 1998 proposal put forward by the Minsk Group of the OSCE. The plan advocates broad autonomy for Karabakh, which would be joined to Azerbaijan in a loose confederation. Such an arrangement would allow Baku to reclaim territory in Azerbaijan proper that was occupied by Armenian forces during the Karabakh conflict. That, in turn, would permit the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As most IDPs currently live in conditions of dire poverty, repatriation could significantly boost domestic security.
Many politicians in Azerbaijan are opposed to any settlement that infringes upon the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and some opposition leaders have characterized OSCE proposals as "defeatist." At the same time, Azerbaijan possesses neither the diplomatic cards nor the military capacity to produce a Karabakh settlement that would be more in line with opposition thinking. The Karabakh conflict, which was suspended in 1994, resulted in approximately 30,000 deaths. When hostilities ended, Armenian forces controlled not only Karabakh, but also large swaths of Azerbaijan proper.
In two speeches, February 23 and 24, Aliyev argued for greater pragmatism in negotiations. "We can neither reject the Minsk Group nor the OSCE, because there is no alternative," Aliyev told MPs in on February 24th. "All the work that we have been carrying out comes up against the fact that Armenian armed forces will withdraw [from occupied territories in Azerbaijan] only if Nagorno-Karabakh's status is determined. If this does not happen, Armenia will do nothing. All other countries are also telling us this."
Aliyev's speech drew praise from some sectors of the Armenian media. The newspaper Yerkir, for example, said: "Probably, the Azerbaijani president has already adapted to the historical truth and the political reality of [Nagorno-Karabakh] and Armenia being one and indivisible." Meanwhile, Armenia's political leadership has not seemed inclined to make Aliyev's difficult task of agreeing to an unpopular peace any easier. In the days before the Paris summit, Aliev expressed the hope that Armenia would make fresh proposals that would help the OSCE peace plan more palatable for Azerbaijan. However, Armenian leaders reportedly unveiled no new initiatives in Paris.
There are indications that Aliyev may find it increasingly difficult to persuade domestic public opinion to accept a Karabakh settlement along the lines of the known OSCE proposals. Already, Azerbaijan's political opposition, whose cohesiveness had previously been hampered by personal differences, is finding common ground in resisting a "defeatist" peace. On March 6, two independent political activists - Namazov and Tofig Zulfulgarov, both former members of Aliyev's inner circle -- unveiled a draft Karabakh peace plan that assailed the government's lack of resolve to maintain Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
The plan, which is supported by prominent opposition leaders, including Etibar Mamedov and Ali Kerimov, calls on Baku to offer Karabakh Armenians autonomy within the Azerbaijani state. The blueprint says that Azerbaijan must be willing to undertake diplomatic and military measures in order to attain the goal of maintaining the state's territorial integrity, the Turan news agency reported.
Aliyev's latest attempt to produce a breakthrough in Karabakh negotiations appears to have hit a snag. The most recent round of Karabakh talks, held March 4-5 in Paris, ended without making tangible progress, and Aliyev and his Armenian counterpart, President Robert Kocharyan, were tight-lipped about the substance of the discussions. Nevertheless, French President Jacques Chirac, who mediated the talks, attempted to put a positive spin on the talks by expressing optimism that a settlement could be achieved before the end of 2001.
For Aliyev, the Karabakh peace process represents a delicate balancing act. The Azerbaijani president has staked out a pragmatic negotiating stance that clashes with prevailing public opinion. Some observers say Aliyev's apparent willingness to compromise is rooted in a desire to bolster the prospects for a smooth leadership succession, in which the elder Aliyev would transfer power to his son, Ilham. But, as one political scientist suggests, any deal that is perceived by Azerbaijanis as giving away too much could backfire for the Azerbaijani leader.
"Society could unite against any peace that is perceived as unjust," said Eldar Namazov, a political scientist in Baku who served as a top presidential aide. "On the question of Karabakh, no one can afford to ignore public opinion."
In the days leading up to the Paris summit, Aliyev sought to prepare public opinion for a compromise solution that would follow the rough outlines of a 1998 proposal put forward by the Minsk Group of the OSCE. The plan advocates broad autonomy for Karabakh, which would be joined to Azerbaijan in a loose confederation. Such an arrangement would allow Baku to reclaim territory in Azerbaijan proper that was occupied by Armenian forces during the Karabakh conflict. That, in turn, would permit the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As most IDPs currently live in conditions of dire poverty, repatriation could significantly boost domestic security.
Many politicians in Azerbaijan are opposed to any settlement that infringes upon the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and some opposition leaders have characterized OSCE proposals as "defeatist." At the same time, Azerbaijan possesses neither the diplomatic cards nor the military capacity to produce a Karabakh settlement that would be more in line with opposition thinking. The Karabakh conflict, which was suspended in 1994, resulted in approximately 30,000 deaths. When hostilities ended, Armenian forces controlled not only Karabakh, but also large swaths of Azerbaijan proper.
In two speeches, February 23 and 24, Aliyev argued for greater pragmatism in negotiations. "We can neither reject the Minsk Group nor the OSCE, because there is no alternative," Aliyev told MPs in on February 24th. "All the work that we have been carrying out comes up against the fact that Armenian armed forces will withdraw [from occupied territories in Azerbaijan] only if Nagorno-Karabakh's status is determined. If this does not happen, Armenia will do nothing. All other countries are also telling us this."
Aliyev's speech drew praise from some sectors of the Armenian media. The newspaper Yerkir, for example, said: "Probably, the Azerbaijani president has already adapted to the historical truth and the political reality of [Nagorno-Karabakh] and Armenia being one and indivisible." Meanwhile, Armenia's political leadership has not seemed inclined to make Aliyev's difficult task of agreeing to an unpopular peace any easier. In the days before the Paris summit, Aliev expressed the hope that Armenia would make fresh proposals that would help the OSCE peace plan more palatable for Azerbaijan. However, Armenian leaders reportedly unveiled no new initiatives in Paris.
There are indications that Aliyev may find it increasingly difficult to persuade domestic public opinion to accept a Karabakh settlement along the lines of the known OSCE proposals. Already, Azerbaijan's political opposition, whose cohesiveness had previously been hampered by personal differences, is finding common ground in resisting a "defeatist" peace. On March 6, two independent political activists - Namazov and Tofig Zulfulgarov, both former members of Aliyev's inner circle -- unveiled a draft Karabakh peace plan that assailed the government's lack of resolve to maintain Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
The plan, which is supported by prominent opposition leaders, including Etibar Mamedov and Ali Kerimov, calls on Baku to offer Karabakh Armenians autonomy within the Azerbaijani state. The blueprint says that Azerbaijan must be willing to undertake diplomatic and military measures in order to attain the goal of maintaining the state's territorial integrity, the Turan news agency reported.
Kenan Aliev is a journalist, based in Washington, DC.
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