The Moscow hostage crisis appears to have reinforced Russian President Vladimir Putin's intent to crush Chechen separatism. Despite signs of war-weariness among the Russian population, Putin appears ready to shun negotiations and prolong Russia's military campaign in Chechnya.
Ironically, the hostage crisis, which ended October 26, occurred days after Russian officials appeared confident that a negotiated settlement of the conflict could be achieved largely on terms dictated by Moscow. Kommersant reported on October 17 that Russia had scheduled talks with Chechen separatists for early November and that State Duma Deputy Aslanbek Aslakhanov had authority to offer the Chechen delegates "full or partial autonomy for Chechnya within the framework of the Russian state."
Moscow reportedly had decided that this offer would save face for Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov, whom Russian officials widely cast as a "beaten dog." Though few expected immediate results, many believed that the meeting would offer hope of progress for peace talks. That hope evaporated when 50 Chechen militants took some 750 hostages in a Moscow theatre on October 24. What happens between Russian and Chechen leaders now depends in large part on what strategic goals guide Putin's policies.
Putin now seems prepared to shun peace talks. "Russia will make no deals with terrorists and will not give in to any blackmail," he said on national television. This continuation of the hard line occurs as Chechnya's strategic importance is shifting. Conceding autonomy to separatists would be a tactical defeat, while keeping the breakaway republic inside Russia would assure strategic victory in two ways. First, the settlement would lower the risk of wholesale disintegration in the multi-ethnic and volatile North Caucasus. Second, it would leave Moscow with strong leverage over Chechnya's still important energy pipeline network. These virtues have shifted in priority in recent years.
Analysts have often cited oil as the cause behind Russia's insistence on controlling Chechnya. But this ignores recent history. In the first Chechen war of 1994-96, billions of dollars in oil-related income and investment remained up for grabs. A quiescent Chechnya would have encouraged Western companies to develop fields in and around the Caspian Sea to flow through Russia. Caspian energy developments have since plotted oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russian territory. On its own, Chechnya's hydrocarbon reserves are less than one half of one percent of Russia's proven reserves. If economic and strategic benefits once outweighed the political and human cost of war in Chechnya, that balance has changed. Putin will now probably work to minimize Chechyna's ability to damage Russia's economic development and stability.
The hostage-taking and the fiasco that followed must be enormously embarrassing for Putin, who has maintained that Chechnya is under control, at least militarily. An overnight policy transformation is heavily unlikely, as it would neither suit Putin's image as a tough, consistent and cool deliberator or strengthen Moscow's negotiating hand. However, the death of 117 people, the episode's global newsworthiness, and the fact that 50 Chechen militants could carry out such an operation in Russia's capital will force him to at least re-articulate his Chechen policy in the current context.
According to opinion polls conducted by the All Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research, only 29 percent of Russians supported the military campaign in Chechnya in July. In contrast, support for Putin's tough military response stood at 70 percent in mid-2000. In 1999, apartment buildings in Moscow were bombed, emboldening then-Prime Minister Putin to quell the separatist movement militarily. By contrast, the Moscow theater debacle may deepen public conviction that a military solution has become untenable.
Until the hostage crisis, Putin had escaped unhurt from the consequences of the war, primarily because most carnage has occurred within Chechnya. However, the siege in Moscow, after months of high-profile attacks by rebels including that shooting of a Mi-26 transport helicopter which killed 118 Russian officers in August show that Chechen separatism has evidently shifted tactics rather than crumbling. Separatists now seem intent on mounting insurgency operations aimed at grabbing international headlines and invigorating Russian domestic public opinion against the war. This game could aggravate instability in the North Caucasus, something Putin can ill afford.
In this context, calls for negotiation are growing louder among policy analysts, in contradiction of Putin's policies. Pavel Felgengauer, a military analyst, told Ekho Moskvy radio on October 26 that it is time for Putin to seriously reevaluate his standpoint. He noted that Moscow had hosted its first anti-war rally in more than three years the previous day and concluded that troops would eventually have to withdraw from Chechnya anyway. Although it remains unclear whether Maskhadov had himself sanctioned the siege, he surely appreciates how its grisly conclusion damaged the Russian psychology.
Putin's team has sounded shaken. On October 27, Akhmed Zakayev warned on Russian Public TV (ORT) that future rebel operations could target a nuclear facility. "The consequences of that could be catastrophic not only for both Russian and Chechen society," he said, "they could be so for the whole of Europe." It is an open question, though, whether Putin is wise to reject outright the idea of negotiating with Maskhadov.
Maskhadov does not fully control the Chechen separatist movement. There are different factions at large and approximately one third of the movement is believed to act outside his control. He condemned the seizure of the theatre, but his envoy warned that radical rebel groups might launch similar attacks unless Moscow negotiated an end to its military campaign. Movsar Barayev, who led the theater attack, told NTV television that he was working under orders from Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev. He said one of the objectives of his mission was to force Moscow to start peace talks with Maskhadov. Maskhadov appointed Basayev as the head of the rebels' operations command in June.
If Putin takes a long-term view, he will probably not demonize the secular Maskhadov. Down the road, the elected leader of the Chechens would make a much more rational adversary than radicals would. If Putin wants to protect every economic possibility that he can, he will have to address a growing public cry for negotiations. Liberal politician Boris Nemtsov, head of the Union of Right Forces, has called for a peace process. If Putin dismisses such calls, he and his electorate face difficult choices about the best course for Russia's future.
Alex Vatanka is the editor of Janes Sentinel Russia & CIS.
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