Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia's foreign policy establishment is rethinking the concept of empire. In the case of Moscow's approach towards Central Asia, ideas about territorial domination no longer play a significant role in the formulation of strategy, according to a source with access to Russia's policy-making mechanisms. While the aim in Central Asia remains the maintenance of stability, foreign policy shapers are accepting of the notion that Russian national interests are best served by the exploitation of economic levers of influence.

For the new Kremlin strategy to be effective, the source says, Moscow needs to address a number of related security and social issues. Accordingly, Russian leaders are determined to combat the spread of Islamic radicalism into Central Asia, and are acting to prevent the penetration of Western business interests.

At the same time, the Kremlin is seeking to persuade ethnic Russians living in Central Asia to remain in the region, rather than emigrate. Ethnic Russians in Central Asia are now viewed by the Russian foreign policy establishment as a key asset in the attempt to tie Central Asian economies to Russia's. Since the Soviet collapse the number of ethnic Russians living in Central Asia has fallen from about 9.5 million, or 19.3 percent of the region's overall population, in 1989 to approximately 6.9 million, or 12.4 percent, today.

There are many strategic interests that compel Russia to seek to retain a sphere of exclusive influence in Central Asia. Perhaps most importantly, the region is seen by Moscow as a bulwark against undesirable radical Islamic influences emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, Moscow is willing to commit a considerable portion of its resources to securing the southern border. The Kremlin also views Central Asia as an important market for its industrial output and a reliable source for raw materials, especially cotton and minerals. In addition, Central Asia is seen as a springboard for trade with Iran and China. Another factor in Russia's thinking is that Kazakhstan's Baikonur cosmodrome is responsible for launching upwards of 70 percent of all Russian space missions, and serves a potent symbol for the country's past technical and scientific achievements.

Despite an intense desire to secure Central Asia's southern flank, Russian policy makers recognize the enormity of the task may be beyond their means. Cost estimates for securing the border with Afghanistan and Iran range around $1 billion. Alternately, Moscow has attempted to establish closer military cooperation with Central Asian states, with mixed results. The withdrawal of Russian border guards from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan has greatly hampered the effectiveness of this policy. As a result, Russian officials are now studying the feasibility of establishing a secure border regime along the Russian-Kazakhstan frontier, an idea that had previously been shunned by Russian policy makers.

To prevent any further erosion of Russia's military capacity in Central Asia, Russia is willing to exert considerable pressure on Central Asian nations not to interact with Western security organizations, in particular NATO. Russia additionally views it as a matter of vital national security that Central Asian states remain within CIS common military operational and technical standards: planning, codes, service regulations, military equipment and arms.

Russian-Central Asian trade turnover was estimated at USD $7 billion in 2000, comprising only about 5 percent of Russia's overall trade. However, Russia depends on reliable grain imports from Kazakhstan, and uncombed cotton fiber mainly from Uzbekistan. Moscow also views Central Asia as the principle source of strategic raw materials, including such ores as lead, zinc, copper, cadmium, bismuth and boron.

To expand its economic position in Central Asia, policy makers are now actively promoting the Eurasian Economic Community, as well as Russian participation in the privatization of strategic sectors of the regional economy, including hydro-electric power stations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia will also aggressively seek to secure a dominant role in the development and export of Central Asian oil and gas resources. [For additional information see EurasiaNet's archives]. A key element in Russia's energy strategy is securing a satisfactory agreement on the division of the Caspian Sea [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives].

In pursuing its strategic aims, Russia is willing to offer virtually unconditional support to incumbent Central Asian leaders. The Russian foreign policy establishment considers the existing regimes to offer the greatest chance for the maintenance of stability. There is also a greater willingness on the part of Russia to implement policy on a bilateral basis, and not through multilateral organizations such as the CIS.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian policy towards Central Asia has moved through three distinct phases. The first, which lasted from 1991-95, saw Russia disengage from Central Asia, as Moscow grappled with domestic upheaval. From 1996-2000, Russia sought to restore its once uncontested military-political position in Central Asia, but various instruments designed to promote reintegration, such as the Collective Security Treaty, proved ineffective. Since Putin's ascendancy in 2000, Moscow has pursued economic avenues of influence, which had until that point played a secondary role in the thinking of policy planners.

Throughout all three phases, the biggest obstacle to the achievement of Russia's strategic goals has been perhaps Russia itself. Member of the policy-making apparatus admit privately that the competing agendas of Russia's various power centers --including the Kremlin, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the Parliament and business leaders – were responsible for the inconsistent implementation of policy.

However, under Putin's leadership, Russia's policy elites appear to be more flexible in their strategic thinking and more willing to embrace trade as a tool to promote the country's goals. As for Central Asian leaders, they are finding that, despite an ingrained suspicion of Russian motives, Moscow may be their only viable partner in the quest for regional stability. Thus, policy makers in Moscow feel they have every ability and opportunity to overcome past inconsistencies and implement effective policies in Central Asia that protect Russia's national interests.