Tashkent Promoting Inter-Ethnic Unity, But Strengthening Security Forces Just in Case

The recent ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan has President Islam Karimov’s administration in Tashkent worried about the possibility of ethnic unrest in Uzbekistan. To make sure ethnic passions remain in check, Uzbek leaders have launched a wide-scale propaganda campaign. But just in case the government message doesn’t get through, officials are beefing up the Central Asian nation’s already formidable security forces.
State-controlled television channels in recent weeks have featured reports that convey a strong sense of stability concerning inter-ethnic relations in Uzbekistan, and which downplay the possibility of the kind of violent episode that engulfed southern Kyrgyzstan in mid-June. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The mantra that the government clearly wishes to convey is; ‘all is well in Uzbekistan.’
A late July broadcast on Andijan TV (which offered extensive coverage of ethnic strife in Kyrgyzstan) is representative of the government broadcast strategy: “The unrest in our neighbor’s territory is worrisome to many of our citizens,” the report stated. “But we all have to remember that we live in a country where each citizen enjoys equal rights and is protected by law. Ethnic groups inhabiting our beloved motherland live in harmony and are engaged in peaceful labor. They are all contributing to making Uzbekistan a country with a great future.”
Print media has echoed the unity message. “We can say that tolerance and understanding among various ethnic groups symbolize Uzbekistan’s life. Ethnic cohesion is the main achievement of our independence years,” wrote Nasriddin Muhammadiev, chairman of the National Cultural Center, a quasi-governmental association of ethnic minority organizations, in a commentary published in the Halk Suzi newspaper on July 30.
Overall, Uzbekistan is home to about 130 ethnic minority groups, but Uzbeks comprise roughly 80 percent of the country’s 27.6 million population. Significant minority groups are Russians (5.5 percent of the population), Tajiks (5 percent), Kazakhs (3 percent) and Karakalpaks (2.5 percent),
Local observers say that the rise of Uzbek nationalism and the predominance of ethnic Uzbeks in public life and in business have long irked representatives of other ethnic groups, especially Tajiks and Russians. Tajiks, who are prevalent in and around the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, complained to a EurasiaNet.org correspondent during recent interviews about what they portrayed as discriminatory government policies. One Tajik in Bukhara, for example, recounted that city authorities recently closed Tajik-language schools. Another in Samarkand said that the city administration there purged Tajiks from the bureaucracy in 2009.
Simmering Uzbek-Tajik tension reportedly fueled small-scale incidents in Risthan, a small town in the Ferghana Valley, as well as in Samarkand and Bukahara, local observers said. Authorities suppressed media coverage of these episodes.
From the start of the violence in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbek leaders have reacted with caution to the upheaval, anxious to prevent any sort of spill-over effect. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Perhaps the most tangible sign of the government’s concern about inter-ethnic relations in Uzbekistan is a nationwide billboard campaign. The billboards all carry the same message: “This precious motherland belongs to all of us. Ensuring its prosperity and bright future must be the goal of every citizen.”
Interviews with local observers suggest that the propaganda is falling on deaf ears and blind eyes among a population that is accustomed to a government with extensive experience in the totalitarian art of information control. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
“Every year the government comes up with a new campaign idea,” said one Tashkent-based intellectual. “But apart from putting up billboards in the streets and devoting a few broadcasts on TV, the government does little to that effect. People don’t believe what the government says anymore.” The observer went on to say that government’s unity campaign does not address structural flaws, especially the issue of Uzbek nationalism and the exclusion of ethnic minorities from public life. “Uzbek cultural themes dominate public life,” the observer said. “The government is still telling people that this is the Uzbeks’ land.”
It would seem that officials also don’t believe their own hype, evidenced by the fact that the state security presence has been significantly expanded in the Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan’s agricultural heartland and long a center of Islamic conservatism. One Ferghana City resident told EurasiaNet on the condition of anonymity that government has deployed troops in most Kyrgyz populated villages ostensibly to prevent local vigilante Uzbek groups from engaging in reprisal raids.
Coinciding with the state’s rising concern over inter-ethnic relations, defense outlays in Uzbekistan are forecast to reach 3.5 percent of state spending in 2010, up from 2 percent in 2005. Local and regional experts often question the accuracy of official data in Uzbekistan. In the case of defense spending, the actual outlays may be significantly higher than officially reported, analysts suspect.
Local observers say that shows of force are more likely to prevent inter-ethnic tension from bubbling over into violent confrontations than are messages of tolerance. “If the government did not rely on the use of force, Uzbekistan could plunge into chaos, just like what happened in Kyrgyzstan,” the Tashkent observer said. “In Kyrgyzstan, the state was very weak. In Uzbekistan, the state is strong because it has a powerful military. ”
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