The future of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process appears increasingly fragile amid growing Turkish objections to a decision by Armenia's Constitutional Court on protocols the two countries signed last October.

The court decision "contains preconditions and restrictive conditions which impair the letter and spirit of the protocols," Turkey's Foreign Ministry said in a statement issued in mid-January. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Murat Mercan, the head of the Turkish parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, which like its Armenian counterpart has to ratify the protocols, added January 22 that there were no immediate plans for a committee vote. "In practical terms," he said, "there is no difference between sitting on [the protocols] in a parliamentary commission, and reneging on them altogether."

On January 25, diplomatic sources confirmed that Turkey was planning to issue a written protest about the court's decision to Switzerland, which brokered the signing of the protocols, and to the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, which is leading talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Analysts have reacted with surprise to the vehemence of Turkish reactions. "It is out of all proportion," said Richard Giragosian, director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies. "It is though [the Turkish government] was looking for a political justification to pull out" of the protocols.

Issued on January 12, the Constitutional Court's decision in essence confirmed that the protocols were in line with Armenia's constitution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

What appears to have angered Turkish politicians was the court's detailed analysis. They [Turkish officials] allege the Armenian high court's ruling calls into question Turkey's 87-year border with Armenia, as well as stipulates that an agreement between the two countries should not override Yerevan's efforts to achieve international recognition for what Armenians, like many historians, see as the 1915 genocide of Ottoman Armenians.

A foreign affairs columnist with the Turkish daily Haberturk, Soli Ozel disagrees. "There is nothing in the court decision that overshadows the protocols signed last October, as far as I can see", Ozel said. "Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan mismanaged this process by linking the normalization of relations with Armenia to the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. The court decision provides a long-awaited means to pass the buck."

Long seen by Turkish nationalists as a brother nation, Azerbaijan has opposed Turkey's rapprochement with Armenia from the start. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Erdogan first made the link between Armenian rapprochement and Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority Armenian region of Azerbaijan that has been under Armenian control for more than two decades, when talks first hit the headlines last spring. But it is only recently that his insistence on the link has begun to leave Turkey looking lonely on the international stage. US and Russian leaders have repeatedly supported the view that the Karabakh peace process and the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement are separate issues.

Some local foreign policy analysts suggest that Russian disapproval of Ankara's stance constitutes an especially high obstacle for Ankara to overcome. A foreign affairs expert with the Turkish daily Radikal, Erdal Guven sees the Turkish government's disagreement with Russia as characteristic of Ankara's tendency to over-estimate its geopolitical influence.

"[Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet] Davutoglu likes to talk about Turkey being a country that sets the agenda rather than following it, but in the South Caucasus, at least, Moscow is the king, not Ankara," he says.

But he also thinks that, while it fits into Ankara's declared policy of resolving problems with its neighbors -- a policy that has led to vastly improved relations in particular with Syria, Iraq and Russia -- the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was always going to be a long-shot. "The advantage Armenia stands to gain from relations with Turkey is obvious, but what will Turkey gain -- apart from applause from Europe and Washington?" he asked.

"This [Turkish] government is trying to turn Turkey into an energy hub, and it is Azerbaijan that has the gas, not Armenia. If push comes to shove, Ankara will stick with Baku," Guven said.