Agriculture, once the mainstay of Uzbekistan's economy, now threatens to cause a rupture as the country faces a water shortage. Uzbek law obliges farmers to sell the government part of their harvest of grain. Normally, farmers can use or sell the rest, but this year's water shortage has aggravated pressure to meet state quotas. Many farmers have surrendered their entire crop to the government. And since the government pays below-market prices, this means a real risk of bankruptcy for many. They have responded. Farmers blocked roads in the Jizak region on June 27, demanding the seizures be stopped. Previously, others confronted soldiers who were guarding the harvest. Uzbek authorities should take these as warning signals, because scarce grain could trigger explosive results.
During the Soviet era, Uzbeks specialized in cotton growing, buying their grain from elsewhere in the USSR. After economic relations among the former Soviet republics crashed, reliable Uzbek grain imports stopped, forcing the country to buy grain at a moment when prices were relatively high. Uzbekistan consequently decided to pursue a grain self-sufficiency policy. Despite the fact that production has fallen since then, officials insist that this is a realistic goal. Up until July 4, farmers had sold the government 2.43 million tons of grain, which represent 95 percent of the government's target for 2001. But the government may be underestimating demand. According to international standards, the average per capita grain needed is 1,000 kg per year. Hence, with a population of 24 million people, Uzbekistan's annual production should reach 24 million tons. Grain quotas clearly do not induce farmers to overproduce, and the revenue gains they trigger are modest at best. And unless the government starts paying fairer prices, quotas will ruin farmers' livelihoods and may foster civil unrest.
There is too little grain to make the system efficient. Last year, Uzbekistan gathered less than 3 million tons of grain from more than 1 million hectares - a rather low productivity compared to other countries. Although the government opened up 100,000 more hectares of land for grain sowing, the harvest was still below 1999 figures. Drought may explain some of the shortages, but Leif Hansen, an IMF division chief responsible for Uzbekistan, believes that the agricultural system is just as much to blame. Furthermore, grain now eats up about half the acreage that once grew animal feed. This has devastated efforts to industrialize animal husbandry. Tashkent's policy blithely leaves farmers without surplus or alternative crops, which they have traditionally used to supplement their incomes. Farmers, and the rural residents who depend on them, often turn to crime.
Experts suggest that last year's contraband flour represented more than 0.5 million tons, despite a campaign from the authorities to snuff out violations. But this is hardly the most severe kind of crop-related lawlessness. The severe economic crisis creates volatile conditions in the Ferghana Valley and elsewhere, as perceptions of inequity can spur violence. The Valley's high population growth it covers 4.3 percent of the country's territory and houses 28 percent of its population intensifies strong social pressures.
For rural people, who comprise 60 percent of Uzbekistan's population, transfers out of the agricultural sector are also more unsettling than other post-Soviet adjustments. The government's grain price-fixing aggravates the gap between those who benefit from a market system and those who don't. In the year 2000, agriculture grew only by 3.2 percent and industrial production by 6.4 percent. Citizens find this difference frustrating; it's no coincidence that the first significant public Islamic movement, "Justice" (Adolat), arose in 1991 in Namangan, a poor region with a strong agricultural base. Islamic activism, dressed up as a response to moral and social degradation, remains a force today in the rhetoric of the "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan" and "Party of Liberation" (Hizb-ut Tahrir) parties. In a nightmare scenario, Islamists could use grain-related rhetoric to co-opt widespread economic discontent.
International aid can help dissolve this scenario. The Aga Khan Development Network, an ecumenical foundation controlled by the Imam of the Ismaili Muslims, has managed to promote self-sufficiency in grain production in Badakhshan, Tajikistan. Observers had long presumed such a goal to be unattainable because of various environmental limitations. But so far, Uzbekistan's government has shown little interest in foreigners' ideas.
They are imperiling themselves. Uzbek leaders must approach agricultural problems with stability in mind. To prevent serious unrest, the government should both buy at fair prices and cooperate with neighboring governments. World Bank specialists have encouraged the Uzbek government to make more grain purchases from Kazakhstan which would produce enough grain and flour to satisfy the country's needs. Meanwhile, if the government allows for alternative crops, Uzbek farmers could start selling again to Kazakhstan and Russia. If Uzbekistan fails to adjust its grain policy, upcoming crops may embitter the entire country.
Antoine Blua is a freelance writer who specializes on Central Asian affairs.
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