The stall in rail traffic continues in Uzbekistan, as a result of an alleged terrorist explosion November 17, with now 320 cars piled up unable to be moved to Tajikistan, Asia-Plus reported . As three weeks have passed without resolution, more urgent questions are being asked about the real reasons behind the blast, and different hypotheses are being constructed. An initial conclusion that perhaps terrorists had meant to attack the US-created Northern Distribution Network (NDN) supplying NATO troops has been discarded. The actual route to Afghanistan does not appear to have been affected -- although Western military officials remain tight-lipped about the incident.
Some observers have asked whether in fact Uzbek intelligence staged the incident itself in retaliation against Tajikistan in an ongoing water resources war -- Tashkent doesn't want Dushanbe to build the Roghun hydropower station that it believes will adversely affect its irrigation-intensive lucrative cotton crops. Myles Smith of Inside the Cocoon pushes further and asks if the motivation for the Uzbeks themselves possibly staging a bombing may have gone beyond the Roghun dispute into trying to knock out Tajikistan's competing role in supplying the NDN.
As Smith says, the particular rail line in question is irrelevant to Uzbekistan's own economy and to its own role in helping the NDN. "The damage occurred on a section of track after the NDN freight turns off to Afghanistan, in the desert before crossing into Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has no other use for this line and appears in no hurry to see it repaired," says Smith. The line doesn't supply Roghun, either, which explains past hold-ups. Instead, the route may be related to Tajikistan's pitches to NATO to help the NDN with humanitarian aid deliveries. Tajik rail officials say they have already helped with some cargo and wish to expand, and believe congestion could be relieved at Termez by allowing offloading of cargo to Tajikistan and trucking over a new American-built bridge to Afghanistan. While US military planners would no doubt like to diversify their options, they would have to then manage the fall-out for exacerbating deadly Central Asian rivalries that could wind up making them the loser.
A series of revelations from the British press have raised the question of just how much influence Uzbekistan has over the British government. The Independent launched a special investigation where reporters disguised as agents of the Uzbek government contacted leading public relations firms to see what they could do to help with "reputation laundering" for the Uzbek dictatorship, notorious for its grave human rights abuses. The PR firms in question didn't actually do any work for Uzbekistan -- it was a sting organized by journalists to make a point about just how vulnerable British politics are to highly-influential firms connected to the leadership are willing to get into bed with tyrants for the right price.
Another scandal covered in the tabloid Daily Mail was the "phenomenal" real-estate deal made between Anthony Rosenfeld, a key donor and advisor for the British Labour Party with President Islam Karimov's controversial daughter Lola Karimova-Tillyaev and her husband, Timur Tillyaev. Karimova purchased a £30 million mansion in Geneva, netting Rosenfeld a £21 million profit. Uzbekistan is once again ranked at the bottom in the annual Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, and it is because of transactions like this by powerful, unaccountable figures in Uzbekistan.
Even before the question of influence in these scandals, however, the UK has been courting Uzbekistan anyway. British ambassador Rupert Joy was criticized by activists last year when he appeared at a fund-raiser for the charities of Karimov’s eldest daughter Gulnara Karimova during style-uz week, supported by the UK. The current British Prime Minister David Cameron seems to have charted a course of cooperation with Tashkent. Things haven't gone so well for Great Britain, however, possibly explaining why Amb. Joy didn't appear at style.uz this year. A British press secretary who arranged a perfectly legitimate conference on Embassy premises with human rights groups in Tashkent was arrested and fined on charges of "illegal association." The British firm Oxus Gold had its assets seized and its chief engineer arrested. The British Foreign Office protested these incidents but to no avail.
The issue of British corporate involvement in the Uzbek cotton trade, which exploits child labor, has also been debated in parliament. Yet there's still a struggle going on given the conflicting needs of trade and energy security. Earlier this year, Berlin-based European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) tried targeting European Union companies that profit from child labor by using an international complaints procedure. The UK government then published a statement regarding British companies ICT Cotton Limited (ICTC) and Cargill Cotton Limited saying essentially that the companies do not find that child labor is systematic enough to cease trading, but await further investigation by an appropriate international body. Yet the International Labor Organization (ILO) is not permitted to enter Uzbekistan.
Shakeups in the Uzbek government reported in recent weeks likely are related to efforts by President Karimov to ensure a safe succession for himself and his family from the scene, with immunity from prosecution and some ability to control events in his remaining lifetime. The Uzbek dictator has personally removed governors who he claims only now to find corrupt, and it’s not clear if their real sin is insufficient loyalty to him, and perhaps connection to his prime minister, whom he may wish to keep off-balance so he does not grow too powerful. Even Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev is rumored to be facing imminent dismissal, but it is not known if such claims are in fact leaks to the media by his enemies. The public has reason enough to dislike the prime minister, as he is associated not only with issues like the sanctioning of forced child labor and torture, but also unpopular policies such as forcible collection of gas debts at a time when many people in the provinces are sitting without gas and electricity in the cold.
Perhaps to burnish his image, Mirziyoyev has been actively recruiting friends on Facebook for the last six months and now has 1,888. It’s difficult to know if the account is really his, and apparently some government officials have denied it. Yet curiously, the account persists, despite the fact that for a public figure of Mirziyoyev’s stature, it should be trivial to get the account removed on grounds of identity theft.
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