Aware that they will be judged by "what kind of Afghanistan we leave behind," Bush Administration officials say they are increasingly concerned about the survival of Hamid Karzai's interim government in Kabul. The Administration is stepping up efforts to bolster Afghan security forces, yet it is reluctant to commit more US troops.

Recent developments indicate that stabilization efforts in Afghanistan remain fragile. Afghan security forces on April 3 arrested dozens of suspects who allegedly conspired to overthrow Karzai's interim government.

A senior Bush Administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, supported an earlier Afghan assessment that exiled warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, along with the "non-elected" part of the Iranian leadership, were behind the coup attempt.

The incident is prompting US officials to concentrate on training programs designed to enhance security conditions in Afghanistan. The twin priorities for Washington over the near- and medium-term are the convocation of a successful Loya Jirga and improvements in Afghan military and security services capacity. The Loya Jirga, or grand tribal council, is expected to convene in June to establish the framework for the country's future political system.

A major component of the US strategy is a build up of the Afghan military to between 60,000 and 70,000 troops. Such a force would be capable of establishing centralized authority across Afghanistan, according to Bush Administration thinking. In addition, US advisors will provide personal protection training to the nascent Afghani secret service.

At the same time, the administration official said the United States is unwilling to commit large numbers of American troops to Afghanistan, and it does not desire to participate in the multi-national peacekeeping force, known as ISAF.

Karzai and United Nations officials have urged that ISAF be expanded to provide security to areas outside of Kabul. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. An expanded ISAF is not feasible, according to the American assessment, because other nations are not willing to contribute forces, which are particularly expensive to maintain in a far away location and in the harsh terrain.

"We don't want Afghanistan to export insecurity or become a net importer of security assistance," the official said.

"It is difficult to build the national army from multiple militias who do not want to go to war, but don't particularly like each other. Still, they don't want to go to war, but might be provoked by outside powers," added the official.

Western European nations appear to support the US approach. Germany is involved in a capacity-building program with the Afghan police force. Meanwhile, Great Britain will provide the counter-narcotics training, while Italy will focus on the legal system training.

Washington hopes a successful Loya Jirga will make the most significant contribution to Afghanistan's stabilization. The tribal conclave may address existing ethnic imbalances that are a leading source of domestic tension. For example, many Pashtuns are currently dissatisfied over their lack of influence in the so-called "power ministries," which are controlled by representatives of the Northern Alliance. Most Pashtuns either cooperated with the Taliban, or remained passive - with the rare exception such as Hamid Karzai.

The ethnic composition of the government may change in the future. Political analysts say some former warlords, including Ismail Khan, as well as representatives of the royalist party, may assume authority in the new Afghan government. To help facilitate international assistance and involvement, UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will also remain active in the country.

In the international arena, US policy makers claim that there should be no "nineteenth century style zero-sum game, but rather a cooperative arrangement" that fosters multilateral cooperation. The administration official indicated that the United States would work to convince Russia, Iran and Pakistan that this is its policy. At the same time, the official suggested Iran posed a threat to security over the near term.

"Tehran allowed safe passage to hundreds of al Qaeda," the official said. "They allowed senior Taliban leaders to escape or are supporting them today. Tehran has sent arms, operatives, large amounts of cash, and even TV and radio equipment.

"They are positioning assets and people for future contingencies. They do not openly oppose the Karzai administration, but [they are] building relationships for the long term," the official continued. "They feel insecure and fear a US encirclement. The insufficiently Islamic nature of the present Afghan regime makes the Iranians nervous. Our bases in Central Asia and Turkey make them nervous. And they take seriously the Bush Administration's desire to see Saddam gone. If Iraq changes, so might Iran."

Ultimately, the administration believes that its policy towards Central Asian states will be more coordinated with policies towards Iran and Afghanistan. Washington now recognizes that in the past Central Asian countries lacked the "southern option" - a network of roads, railroads and pipelines to markets of Pakistan and India, and access to the global markets through the Indian Ocean.

As the increased attention on the southern option suggests, economic development is playing an increasing role in Washington's thinking about the future of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Bush Administration intends to invigorate follow-up to the January donor summit in Tokyo, where over $3.8 billion in aid was pledged. So far, not much financial assistance has been delivered to Afghanistan.