The incoming conservative-led government in Germany will face daunting challenges as it confronts a rapidly changing security environment in Europe while trying to protect Ukrainian sovereignty.

On the one hand, there is “an autocratic, perhaps even totalitarian aggressor” in the Kremlin, and on the other, “an unpredictable actor within the system of checks and balances” in the White House, Timm Beichelt, a professor at the European University Viadrina, told Eurasianet. The “aggressor versus friend” dichotomy has disappeared, and an unprecedented shift in Germany’s trans-Atlantic relations is occurring, Beichelt added.

This is the situation now facing Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting. After winning the federal election February 23, his center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) now must engage in difficult talks on forming a government with the likely coalition partner being the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Only after a government is in place will Merz be able to address the security conundrum.

Merz has made it clear that his immediate foreign policy priority is strengthening European defense capabilities as quickly as possible “so that we can really achieve independence from the US step by step.” He has previously toyed with the idea of a new European defense alliance, hinting at the possibility of persuading France to extend its nuclear umbrella over Germany. On February 23, he went so far as to ask whether, at a NATO summit in June, “we will still be talking about NATO in its current form” or whether “we will have to establish an independent European defense capability much more quickly.”

“It is a completely different constellation now,” Beichelt said. “So, it might be time for the German government to look at [the Treaty on European Union] and somehow spell out to what extent this could actually be an operational mechanism” to bolster European defense capabilities.

According to Zsuzsanna Végh, a program officer at the German Marshall Fund, Merz’s government will strive to act as “a driving force behind strengthening the defense agenda within the EU.” This transformation, she added, will take time.

In the meantime, what to do about Ukraine? As Merz tries to form a stable German government, the Trump administration is trying to cut a Ukraine deal with Russia that could place Europe in a precarious security position. By all appearances, the White House is willing to agree to a ceasefire agreement that is highly beneficial to Russia. After talks with Trump in Washington, French President Emmanuel Macron said a truce could come within weeks.

“The United States is moving forward without Europe right now because it sees the EU as a minor player on the field,” Végh said. 

There is not much Merz can do presently to bolster Ukraine’s defense capabilities. In December 2024, he promised to supply long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine if he became chancellor. The question is whether he will now go ahead with these deliveries, in a symbolic gesture to demonstrate Berlin’s leadership on the Ukrainian agenda as Kyiv has entered the fourth year of war. 

Végh believed that circumstances have become much more complex and that “the context itself is changing rapidly.” Members of the Free Democrats (FDP), a centrist party that did not make it into parliament, have called on Merz to act immediately. But as early as December, he indicated that Berlin would not act “unilaterally” on the missile-supply issue, but only in close consultation with Washington and European allies. 

“The move would also have to be approved and decided by the new coalition government between the CDU, its sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the SPD,” Végh added.

The negotiations to form a government promise to be complicated, but a grand coalition will likely not mean a significant shift on Germany’s Ukraine stance. Leading Social Democratic Party politicians, including Lars Klingbeil and Boris Pistorius, have been stoutly pro-Ukraine. Pistorius, the outgoing defense minister, has been an outspoken critic of Russia, and earlier in February said it was “regrettable” that the Trump administration “has made public concessions to [Russian leader Vladimir] Putin before [ceasefire] negotiations have even begun.”

One of the key issues on the table is the reform of Germany’s constitutionally enshrined debt brake. Defense spending is becoming increasingly important given the security gap Germany and Europe face as the Trump administration’s rapprochement with Russia grows. “The goal is not to remove the debt brake altogether, but to create room for fiscal maneuver,” said Nils Diederich, a German Social Democratic Party politician and political scientist. 

The conservative bloc, the Social Democrats, and the Greens will not have the two-thirds majority in the new parliament to push through the reform. And the Left Party would only support an increase in defense spending if it were linked to social improvements. These potential difficulties in getting the changes through, whether in this or the next parliament, make the question of Germany’s ability to fund its growing defense ambitions while balancing this with support for Ukraine all the more challenging.

Meanwhile, amid mounting financial strains, a growing rift with the US, and difficulties on the Ukrainian front, experts believe Berlin’s Central Asia policy under Merz’s leadership will remain on the back burner. Beichelt does not expect a drastic departure from the regional course set by the outgoing government. “I don’t see any reason why Germany should withdraw from the Z5+1 format it has established with all five Central Asian states. It is a useful framework,” he said.

Beichelt believes the format contributes to the German government’s view that multilateralism is the way forward. “The fact that Trump is now turning to bilateralism is an encouragement for Berlin to invest even more in multilateral formats,” he said.